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This article introduces a new high-frequency analysis of six years of data for 
options written on the S&P 500 and traded on the Chicago Board of 
Exchange. I quantify in real time the information contained in the probability 
measure implied by option prices, using concepts developed in information 
theory. Here information is analogous to a reduction in uncertainty 
surrounding the future price of the underlying security. A simple 
nonparametric estimator allows us to measure the amount of information 
gained as an option approaches maturity. I then test for jumps in the 
expectation of said future price. I find the intraday flow of information in a 
large and important market is not continuous, and often increases in discrete 
intervals. This fact is used to identify events in which a large amount of 
information is revealed to investors. 
1 Introduction 
How does information arrive in financial markets? In this paper, I confront 
the basic characterization of the process by which investors learn about the 
future value of an asset. The topic is of importance to much of financial eco-
nomics, yet continues to be one of the least explored. Indeed, this paper is the 
first to quantify in real time how information drives price discovery in option 
markets. In doing so, the paper offers three methodological contributions to 
the literature on measuring the information found in option prices, and doc-
uments two empirical facts not explained by existing theoretical models. First, 
I find the arrival of information drives jumps in investor expectations of the 
future price, and second, that this process is not constant over the life of an 
option. 
This paper joins a growing literature of high-frequency analysis of investor 
expectations, of which Birru and Figlewski (2012) offer another example. Both 
the literature and this paper estimate the distribution of future returns as 
implied by observed option prices. Following Cox and Ross (1976) and Cox, 
Ross, and Rubinstein (1979), this estimation relies on a representative inves-
tor’s ability to arbitrage an option and its underlying asset. In that way, all 
risk except the underlying uncertainty surrounding the asset’s future price 
may be hedged away. The resulting implied distribution is known as the “risk-
neutral density”. Following Harrison and Kreps (1979), if this distribution is 
known, then options may be priced as if all investors are “risk-neutral”. In 
 
 
other words, the price of an option is independent of the individual risk-pref-
erences of an investor. Figlewski (2018) offers a recent review of the key ideas 
in this literature. Option prices therefore reflect investor beliefs over the prob-
ability the world will achieve some future state, and it is this information that 
is of vital interest to investors, researchers, and policymakers. This fact com-
bined with the growth in derivative markets has inspired renewed interest in 
understanding how the beliefs of investors respond to new information. 
In this paper, I provide a high-frequency analysis of the price discovery 
process in option markets. Using six years of data for options written on the 
S&P 500 and traded on the Chicago Board of Exchange, I characterize the 
intraday evolution of the density function implied by the price of options with 
the same maturity date. The analysis is done for the final 3 months of each 
option’s life cycle, as the density is shown to become more and more concen-
trated over time. This paper is the first to estimate the intraday dynamics of 
the risk-neutral density over the life cycle, and offers the following three meth-
odological contributions to the literature. First, I show how a simple nonpar-
ametric estimator can be used to approximate the implied density of future 
returns at high frequencies. Second, I show how concepts developed in infor-
mation theory can be used to quantify the amount of information contained 
in the estimated density. Third, I show how this novel approach permits a 
simple testing procedure for the presence of jumps in the evolution of the risk-
neutral density, coinciding with the arrival of new information. The results of 
 
 
this testing procedure represent the paper’s main contribution to the litera-
ture. 
I find that information often arrives in discrete intervals. Even at high-
frequencies the risk-neutral density can be shown to jump, a result not antic-
ipated by existing theoretical models. The testing procedure reveals both the 
frequency and magnitude of these jumps in investor expectations. I identify 
at least one jump for a majority of days, and find days without jumps con-
tribute little to the total information gained over the life cycle. I then docu-
ment two empirical facts new to the literature: First, the majority of infor-
mation accrues only in the final month. I show investors learn little about the 
future price of an asset for much of an option’s life. Second, jumps contribute 
a majority of information early in the life cycle. Only in the final month does 
information arrive often enough to contribute more to the total gained. 
The paper builds on earlier work in many ways, but several features distin-
guish the findings from previous results. These include; 1. a focus on the 
evolution of the risk-neutral density over an option’s life cycle, 2. a fully non-
parametric estimation technique, 3. a measure of information as a reduction 
in uncertainty, 4. a simple framework to test for jumps, and 5. the frequency 
and length of the sample of options data used. These features are discussed 
briefly in turn. 
This paper targets the evolution of the risk-neutral density over time. In a 
departure from much of the earlier literature (Aït-Sahalia and Lo, 1998), 
among others, the density is not estimated for a fixed maturity. Instead, for 
 
 
options with the same expiration date, the focus is on how the density be-
comes more concentrated as the maturity date approaches. The new perspec-
tive is shown to permit a simple testing procedure for the presence of jumps 
in the evolution of the density, and does not require the estimated density to 
be interpolated over time. 
The paper employs an estimation procedure that is fully nonparametric. 
Inspired by the original procedure proposed by Breeden and Litzenberger 
(1978), the estimator places no restrictions on the shape of the density func-
tion or the dynamics of the underlying asset’s price. In contrast to semipara-
metric procedures, such as those following Shimko (1993), the estimation pro-
cedure does not require the interpolation or the extrapolation of observed 
option prices, or the need for significant tradeoffs in measures of goodness-of-
fit and smoothness. 
This paper introduces concepts from information theory to quantify the 
uncertainty investors face about the future value of an underlying asset. The 
basic insight is that information can be measured as the reduction in uncer-
tainty over time. The basic quantity of information theory is entropy. The 
concept is not new to economics, and both Sims (2003) and Frankel and Ka-
menica (2019) use entropy to model rational inattention and the information 
in decision problems respectively. Stutzer (2000) and Buchen and Kelly (1996) 
go so far as to use the concept of maximum entropy to infer the risk-neutral 
density from observed prices. However, this paper represents the first 
 
 
application of entropy to the problem of quantifying the information gained 
in the density function over time. 
The paper employs a framework and hypothesis test for jumps in the risk-
neutral density. Here the evolution of the entropy of the density reflects the 
arrival of new information. The procedure is equivalent to testing for jumps 
in a nonstationary time series, and follows Zivot and Andrews (1992). The 
test derives from the literature on testing for unit roots in economic time 
series, beginning with Dickey and Fuller (1979), and generalized by Said and 
Dickey (1984). 
The choice of procedure is threefold. First the test is straightforward and 
transparent. It is fast and simple to implement, and the results are easily 
interpreted. Second, the procedure reveals the frequency, magnitude, and tim-
ing of each jump, three items that are of immediate interest. Third, the pro-
cedure permits a statistical test for each identified jump. In this respect, the 
analysis differs from other high-frequency event-studies, such as Goldberg and 
Grisse (2013) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), among oth-
ers, who examine the response of interest rates and exchange rates to select 
economic news announcements. 
Finally, the paper uses a new dataset of intraday quotes for all options 
written on the S&P 500 and traded on the Chicago Board of Exchange. The 
data was purchased with the support of the Weidenbaum Center on the Econ-
omy, Government, and Public Policy at Washington University in St. Louis. 
The data is novel in two respects, namely the high frequency and long 
 
 
calendar span of the sample of SPX options analyzed. The intraday analysis 
covers six years, or nearly 1,500 trading days, beginning in January 2009 and 
ending in December 2014. In comparison to other high-frequency studies, 
Jiang and Tian (2005) and Birru and Figlewski (2012), who focus on forecast-
ing realized variance and the change in the quantiles of the risk-neutral den-
sity during the fall of 2008, the data and analysis presented here represents a 
more complete picture of the intraday evolution of investor expectations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Background in section 2. Section 3 describes 
the high-frequency options data sample. Section 4 proposes the use of infor-
mation theory to quantify the information in the estimated density. Section 5 
characterizes the nonparametric estimator used to approximate the risk-neu-
tral density. Section 6 describes the framework to test for jumps in the arrival 
of information. Section 7 discusses the results of the hypothesis tests. Section 
8 presents select case studies around events where a large jump in information 
was identified. Section 9 concludes.  
 
2 Background 
2.1 Options  
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value depends on the price of 
an underlying asset. For example, the value of the index options used in this 
paper “derive” from the price of an underlying stock index, the S&P 500. 
Introduced in 1957, the S&P 500 was the first stock index weighted by market 
 
 
capitalization. Today over $9.9 trillion dollars is benchmarked to the index, 
with indexed assets totaling $3.4 trillion. The S&P 500 covers roughly 80% of 
total US market capitalization. Options written on the index trade worldwide, 
in both over-the-counter and exchange-traded markets. The largest and most 
liquid exchange-traded contract is the SPX, traded on the Chicago Board of 
Exchange (CBOE). The CBOE is the largest exchange for trading stock op-
tions. An options exchange offers standardized contracts and manages credit 
risk between counterparties, typically through a centralized clearing house. 
The CBOE began trading standardized contracts in 1973. Today, the notional 
value of SPX options is roughly $5.5 trillion, with the number of open con-
tracts exceeding 20 million. In 2019, the average daily volume exceeded 1.28 
million contracts. 
The SPX contracts used here are European-style call options on the under-
lying S&P 500 Index. The buyer of a European call option has the right to 
buy the underlying asset on a predetermined date (T) and for a predetermined 
price (K). The predetermined date is known as the expiration or maturity 
date. The price is the exercise or strike price. A single SPX contract is for 100 
times the index at the given strike price. Settlement for index options is always 
in cash. If the buyer chooses to exercise the call option, they receive 
( − ) × 100 from the seller where, X is the settlement value of the index. 
Strike prices for SPX options are defined by the exchange. Strike prices for 
options near the value of the underlying index are typically offered at $5 
intervals. For options far from the current value of the underlying index, strike 
 
 
prices may only be available at $10, $25, $50, or $100 intervals. Trading in 
SPX options ends on the business day before the day on which the final set-
tlement value of the index is calculated.  
SPX options trade on a March cycle. All US stock options trade on either 
a January, February, or March cycle. The SPX cycle consists of options ex-
piring every 3 months; March, June, September, and December. The standard 
expiration date is the third Friday of the near expiration month. For example, 
the “June call” is the SPX call option expiring on the third Friday of June, 
and trading in the June call ends on the Thursday before the third Friday. 
When an option expires, trading in a new option with a maturity date set in 
the next expiration month in the cycle begins. Regular trading in SPX options 
occurs every business day from 08:30 to 15:15 Central Time. 
 
2.2 Risk-Neutral Valuation  
Risk-neutral valuation is a general result in the pricing of derivatives. In 
theory, when valuing a derivative we may assume that investors are risk neu-
tral. This assumption means that the individual risk-preferences of investors 
do not enter into the pricing equation. Introduced by Cox and Ross (1976) 
and expanded on in Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979), the concept arises from 
the relationship between a derivative and its underlying asset. Since both are 
affected by the same underlying source of uncertainty, a portfolio can be con-
structed to arbitrage any gain or loss in the asset with an equivalent loss or 
 
 
gain in the derivative. The resulting portfolio would have no risk, and its 
return would be the risk-free rate. The cost of constructing such a portfolio is 
then the price of the derivative. Harrison and Kreps (1979) show that in a 
market with no profitable arbitrage opportunities, the risk-neutral price is the 
correct price, even under risk aversion. In a complete market their result can 
be extended to include the risk-neutral price being unique. 
The idea that information could be extracted from the observed price of an 
option was introduced by Black and Scholes (1973). By inverting the valuation 
formula, Black and Scholes were able to estimate the future volatility of an 
asset, as implied by the current price of its derivative. Merton (1973) extends 
the Black-Scholes model to continuous time. In continuous time, the evolution 
of the price of the underlying asset is modelled as a diffusion process. The 
Black-Scholes-Merton model assumes this process to be a geometric Brownian 
motion. This assumption implies the shape of the terminal distribution of the 
asset’s price is lognormal. If known, this distribution may be used to price an 
option independent of the risk preferences of investors. This is the basic idea 
of risk-neutral valuation. If it is possible to arbitrage an asset and its deriva-
tive, the derivative may be priced as if it were riskless. The terminal distribu-
tion required for obtaining the riskless price is known as the “risk-neutral” 
density.  
In practice, the ability to continuously rebalance such a portfolio is limited 
by transaction costs and financing requirements. The resulting arbitrage is 
then unlikely to be riskless. Consequently, theoretical models do not always 
 
 
perform well empirically. Black and Scholes (1972) discovered this fact early 
on, noting that for options on the same stock the volatility implied by their 
model is not constant across strike prices, thus inventing the well-known 
Black- Scholes “volatility smile”. There now exists a large body of empirical 
evidence that implied volatility is not constant across strike prices and ma-
turities. Taken together, the evidence strongly suggests the assumption of a 
lognormal terminal distribution implied by diffusion process that is a geomet-
ric Brownian motion does not hold in practice. A phenomenon known as the 
Black-Scholes-Merton anomaly. Figlewski (2018) offers a more intensive intro-
duction to the key ideas, issues, and finding introduced here. 
The Black-Scholes-Merton anomaly has led to a large literature that at-
tempts to estimate a risk-neutral density which better fits the observed option 
prices, and it is to this literature that the nonparametric estimator I propose 
contributes. The discussion of the estimator is therefore limited to a class of 
nonparametric and semiparametric methods. This class of methods includes 
other implementations of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), (Shimko (1993), 
Malz (1997), Bliss and Panigirtzoglous (2002), Weinberg (2001), and Dumas, 
Fleming, and Whaley (1998)), and other methods based on such concepts as 
maximum entropy (Buchen and Kelly (1996), and Stutzer (1996)), kernel re-
gression (Ait-shalia and Lo (1998)), and the binomial tree method of Cox, 
Ross, Rubinstein (1979), (Rubinstein (1994), Rubinstein (1996), Jackwerth 
(1997,1999)). For an extensive review of methods for estimating the density 
from observed option prices see Jackwerth (1999), Jondeau and Rockinger 
 
 
(2000), and Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002) Coutant, Jondeau, and Rockinger 
(2001), and Datta, Londono, and Ross (2017)). 
 
3 Data 
Throughout the paper I use data for a sample of options written on the 
S&P 500 and traded on the Chicago Board of Exchange. The data was pur-
chased with the support of the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Govern-
ment, and Public Policy at Washington University in St. Louis. The data is 
novel in two respects, principally the high frequency and long calendar span 
of the sample of SPX options analyzed. The data represent the most complete 
sample of high-frequency investor expectations to date. Here I describe the 
data in detail. 
Daily ‘Trade And Quote’ or TAQ data were obtained from the Chicago 
Board of Exchange (CBOE). The raw files contain all trades and quotes for 
options written on the S&P 500, and traded on the CBOE. The raw data 
consists of daily files for each of what is typically 252 trading days per year. 
The sample covers six years, or approximately 1,500 trading days beginning 
January 2, 2009 and ending December 31, 2014. Regular trading hours occur 
from 08:30 to 15:15 Central Time each day. Quotes are updated throughout 
the day for all available strikes. Trades in SPX options are sparse relative to 
quotes, and are rarely observed simultaneously across strikes. To avoid intro-
ducing additional pricing-errors, quotes are used in the analysis which follows. 
 
 
Each quote consists of bid and ask price, size, and the corresponding strike 
price, together with a timestamp, underlying index price, and flags indicating 
the class of option and market condition, either open or pre-open. Few quotes 
are observed pre-open. 
The traditional SPX options chain is AM-settled on the third Friday of 
every month. Options trading on the March cycle consist of those expiring 
every 3 months; March, June, September, and December. Nontraditional SPX 
options are PM-settled, with varying expiration dates, including the last trad-
ing day of the month and weekly options. ‘Long-term Equity AnticiPation 
Securities’ or LEAPS are traditional SPX options with expiration dates up to 
five years in the future.  
The sample consists of 24 nonoverlapping option chains, beginning with the 
options expiring March 21, 2009 and ending with those expiring December 
20, 2014. Following convention, option chains are referred to by their expira-
tion date. There are on average 62 trading days for each curve, with the March 
2009 option having only 55 trading days observed. The sample consists of 83 
5-minute intervals for each trading day, beginning at 08:25 and ending at 
15:15 Central Time (CT). Intraday quotes are aggregated by strike to the 
corresponding 5-minute interval. 
Only quotes for traditional SPX call options are used, those which are AM-
settled on the third Friday of the near expiration month. Nontraditional SPX 
options and LEAPS are excluded from the sample. To create the 5-minute 
samples used in the analysis, the average of the best bid and offer were taken 
 
 
for the sample of options with quotes posted in the preceding 5-minute. The 
reported 09:00 call price for a given strike is then the mid-price of the best 
bid and best offer observed from 08:55:00.000 to 08:59:59.999. In the rare 
instance where quotes were not observed for a particular strike, the average 
of the best bid and offer price were carried over from the previous interval. 
There are two additional notes regarding the sample. First, trading in tra-
ditional SPX options ends on the business day before the settlement date, and 
before trading in a new option in the following cycle begins. No quotes for the 
current option chain are observed on these days, and they are excluded from 
the sample. Second, far out-of-the-money options are often illiquid, and I ex-
clude call options written on strikes issued at intervals greater than $50.  
The result is a sample of 1,479 days, each day containing 83 5-minute inter-
vals. Each interval contains the average of the best bid and best offer price 
for call options written on strike prices at intervals less than $50. Table 1 
reports daily summary statistics for the sample of options and the underlying 
index. Columns 1-3 report the average number, minimum and maximum ob-
served strikes, call and underlying index prices observed for each day in the 
sample. Columns 4 and 5 report the average and standard deviation of the 
sample of strike, call and underlying index prices for each day. Table 1 reports 
summary statistics for the entire six-year sample, as well as these statistics 
for each year. Table A in the appendix reports the separate summary statistics 
for each option chain. 
 
 
 The number of strikes observed each day is large. Looking at Table 1, 
there are between 117 and 187, and on average 146, strikes observed. Strike 
prices range from $150 to $2,250 and are traded at intervals of less than $50. 
The options sampled cover a large degree of moneyness, with the average ratio 
of the strike price to the current index price ranging from 0.3 to 1.4. Thus on 
a typical day, probabilities between a 70% decrease and 40% increase in the 
index over the following days are observed.  
The average number of quotes observed each day is also large. For the op-
tions sampled, I observe on average approximately 718,000 quotes per day, 
ranging in price from $0.30 to $1,373, with an average mid-price of about $243 
and average daily standard deviation of $219. The value of the underlying 
index ranges from $674 to $2,075, with an average price of around $1,380, and 
a small average daily standard deviation of just $0.18. Finally, the observed 
number of strikes and quotes increases consistently over the six years in the 
sample, as does the value of the underlying index. For simplicity and conven-
ience, much of the analysis refers to options expiring in either the first or last 
year of the sample, 2009 and 2014. This is done to show the findings are not 
artifacts of any larger trends in the market. Figure 1 reports the daily level of 
both the underlying S&P500 Index and the CBOE Volatility Index or VIX 
Index for the sample period. For much of the sample, the value of the under-
lying index is increasing. Implied volatility as calculated by the CBOE is 
highest early in the sample, spikes in mid-2010 and late 2011, and declines 
 
 
steadily from the beginning of 2012. In Table 1 these trends are evident in the 
range of strike prices available and the average value of the underlying index. 
 




Figure 1 reports the daily level of both the underlying S&P 500 Index and the CBOE Volatility 
Index or VIX Index for the sample period. Source: Fred and Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
  
VIX S&P 500 
Year Count Minimum Maximum Average Std. Dev.
All Strikes 146        150        2,250    1,185.85 265.62
Calls 717,850  0.0300   1,373.14  242.59    219.01
Underlying 704,148  674.1500 2,075.37  1,380.50 0.18
2009 Strikes 117        200        1,650    880.37    74.42
Calls 713,010  0.0300   663.64   145.91    40.37
Underlying 713,317  674.15   1,114.16  941.21    112.36
2010 Strikes 125        350        1,500    996.84    22.67
Calls 461,231  0.0300   892.70   189.69    35.84
Underlying 459,336  1,022.24 1,242.87  1,134.38 51.55
2011 Strikes 138        150        1,600    1,087.30 62.90
Calls 646,719  0.0300   1,131.37  232.68    41.98
Underlying 613,337  1,099.65 1,363.65  1,268.69 62.43
2012 Strikes 150        350        1,800    1,157.43 53.06
Calls 527,438  0.0300   1,105.25  255.45    26.21
Underlying 511,441  1,203.72 1,464.25  1,373.27 51.94
2013 Strikes 160        350        2,100    1,389.30 101.63
Calls 792,863  0.0300   1,212.67  277.69    40.67
Underlying 790,280  1,403.03 1,810.83  1,634.21 98.41
2014 Strikes 187        650        2,250    1,600.05 41.70
Calls 1,170,790 0.0300   1,373.14  352.24    42.29
Underlying 1,165,436 1,741.25 2,075.37  1,923.74 76.28
Table 1 reports standard summary statistics for the sample of call options used. Column 1
reports the average number of options, bids, and quotes observed each day. Columns 2
through 4 report their minimum, maximum, and average values for the sample or year
listed. Column 5 reports the standard deviation of the average.
Table 1: Daily Summary Statistics
 
 
4 Information  
4.1 In Option Prices  
Black and Scholes (1973) introduced the idea that information could be 
extracted from the price of traded options. In general, option prices reflect 
investor beliefs over the probability the underlying asset will take a particular 
value. Consider two options with adjacent strikes. Intuitively, any difference 
in their price must reflect the likelihood that the value of the underlying asset 
will fall between them. This holds across all strikes. Therefore the observed 
difference in option prices across strikes, or state-prices, contains information 
about how likely investors believe different states are. Breeden and Litzen-
berger (1978) show how to obtain the entire risk-neutral density from these 
differences. Here the information contained in option prices is extracted as a 
probability distribution over the future value of the underlying index. This 
information allows for a more complete view of investor beliefs; both how they 
evolve over time, and how they change in response to new information or 
events. To extract this information, option prices are combined across strikes 
to mimic a security which pays $1 if an individual state is realized, and $0 if 
not. The price of such security would then be proportional to the probability 
of a state occurring. This idea was first introduced in time-state preference 
model of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959). The result is known as an ‘Arrow-
Debreu’ security, a type of elementary claim whose value is contingent on a 
state being realized.  
 
 
Interpreting the information extracted from option prices requires summa-
rizing the characteristics of the implied probability distribution of random 
process. There much of early the literature focused on using the risk-neutral 
density to estimate the implied volatility of the underlying process, often for 
the purpose of forecasting realized volatility (Canina and Figlewski (1993), 
Weinberg (2001), and Jiang and Tian (2005), among others). Later literature 
has expanded the focus to examining the response of higher-order moments, 
principally skewness and kurtosis, to key events, see for example Birru and 
Figlewski (2012). The approach has known limitations, including the sensitiv-
ity of the estimated risk-neutral density to the choice of estimation methods. 
As a result, quantile moments are often used and are found to be a more 
robust (Datta, Londono, and Ross (2014), Flamouris and Giamouridis (2002) 
and Campa, Chang, and Refalo (2002), Birru and Figlewski (2012)).  
A growing literature studies the information contained in option prices in 
this manner, using the moments of the risk-neutral density to examine a wide 
range of markets; including but not limited to international stock indexes, 
(Kang and Kim (2006), Shiratsuka (2001), Glatzer and Scheicher (2005), Äijö 
(2008), Kim and Kim (2003), and Syrdal (2002)), exchange rates, (Weinberg 
(2001), Bahra (1997), Campa, Chang, and Refalo (2002), and Londono and 
Zhou (2012)), government bonds, (Neuhaus (1995), Shiratsuka (2001), and 
Cheng (2010)), inflation options, (Kitsul and Wright (2012)), and oil com-
modities, (Datta, Londono, and Ross (2014), Melick and Thomas (1997), 
Flamouris and Giamouridis (2002), and Askari and Krichene (2008)).  
 
 
This paper contributes to the literature analyzing the information contained 
in the price of index options, but departs in the methodology employed. Sim-
ilar to Weinberg (2001), Jiang and Tian (2005), Kang, Kim, and Yoon (2010), 
and Birru and Figlewski (2012), the focus here is for options written on the 
S&P 500. Two features however distinguish the analysis from earlier work. 
This include a departure from using both a fixed horizon risk-neutral density 
and the moments of the estimated density function. Instead, I propose the use 
of information theoretic concepts to quantify the amount of information in-
vestors gain about the likely value of the underlying index at maturity over 
time. It is to these concepts I now turn.  
 
4.2 Information Theory 
The basic insight of information theory is to measure information as a re-
duction in uncertainty, and the basic building block is entropy. Entropy quan-
tifies the amount of uncertainty in a random variable, here the outcome of a 
stochastic process (Shannon 1948). Given a random variable X, with proba-
bility density function ( ), entropy is simply − [ ( ) ]. It should be 
noted that the concept applies whether X is a discreet or continuous random 
variable. That is, whether ( ) is a density with respect to a Lebesgue meas-
ure on ℛ , or a discreet measure on a countable set of points. By convention, 
  = 0 for any value X such that  =  0. The base of the logarithm 
determines only a scaling factor for the amount of information. Base 2 is often 
 
 
used as intuitively the outcome of a fair coin toss contains one “bit” of infor-
mation. Here I provided a brief introduction to the basic ideas of information 
theory, for a complete technical introduction see Cover and Thomas (1991). 
The amount of information or entropy in an event is calculated using the 
probability of that event. The more deterministic or certain an event is, the 
less surprising or informative its realization is. The ‘surprisal’ or ‘self-infor-
mation’ of a discreet event x is defined as ℎ(x) = − (x) , and is 0 when 
( ) = 1. Here the intuitive is clear, since no information is learned from a 
certain n outcome. The classic example is that of a fair coin toss, where the 
self-information of a single toss is (1/2) = 1. Compare this event to the 
outcome of a fair dice, and the intuition and idea behind entropy becomes 
even clearer, − (1/6) ≈ 2.58. In a sentence; the more certain an event is, 
the less informative its outcome, and the lower its entropy. 
Calculating the information in a random variable is the same as calculating 
the information of the probability distribution of the events of a random var-
iable. In other words, the amount of information in a random variable is the 
surprisal of each event weighted by the probability of those events. In practice, 
estimating the entropy of a random variable is equivalent to estimating the 
information or surprisal for the probability distribution of events. Entropy 
then is the average amount of information of an event drawn from the prob-
ability distribution of a random variable. 
 
 
In this paper, I propose the use of entropy to quantify the amount of infor-
mation in the risk-neutral density implied by option prices. I employ two 
measures of information, the traditional Shannon (1948) entropy, and the 
generalized Rényi (1961) entropy. Shannon entropy is the expected or average 
amount of information for an event drawn from its distribution. Rényi entropy 
is equivalent to the L2 norm of the distribution. Shannon entropy can be 
shown to generalize to Rényi entropy. Both concepts measure how broadly 
distributed the outcome of a random variable is. The higher the entropy, the 
broader the distribution. For example, the uniform distribution is the ‘maxi-
mum entropy distribution’ on any given interval [ , ].  
Two final points of clarification, I break somewhat with convention in the 
analysis that follows by reporting − ( ) not ( ), and using the natural 
logarithm in place of log base 2 for both Shannon and Rényi entropies. The 
units are then known as “nats”. This is done only for convenience, and does 
not affect the results. The negative rescaling simply allows for both entropies 
to be displayed on a single positive axis, and for the magnitude and direction 
of the gains in information, trend, and jumps to be more readily compared. 
For the remainder of the paper, when uncertainty declines the reported 
measures entropy will be shown to increase. Finally, entropy is not variance, 
which is the measure of variation in a random variable. No, here entropy is 
defined as a measure of uncertainty in the distribution of probabilities, and is 
not equivalent to implied volatility. 
  
Maturity Days 3-Month 1-Month 1-Day 3-Month 2-Month 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 1-Day 3-Month 2-Month 1-Month
2009-03-21 53 0.47 0.71 1.83 0.021 0.018 0.025 0.62 0.93 2.00 0.022 0.020 0.023
2009-06-20 62 0.27 1.03 1.98 0.017 0.014 0.022 0.44 1.24 2.15 0.016 0.014 0.019
2009-09-19 62 0.59 1.10 2.04 0.017 0.015 0.020 0.81 1.32 2.22 0.015 0.014 0.015
2009-12-19 63 0.69 1.30 2.06 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.94 1.52 2.24 0.017 0.018 0.016
2010-03-20 60 0.85 1.42 2.11 0.018 0.019 0.016 1.09 1.66 2.28 0.015 0.017 0.012
2010-06-19 62 0.99 1.16 2.07 0.026 0.023 0.031 1.24 1.42 2.24 0.025 0.022 0.030
2010-09-18 62 0.86 1.20 2.08 0.019 0.019 0.020 1.13 1.42 2.25 0.019 0.019 0.019
2010-12-18 63 0.82 1.32 2.12 0.027 0.030 0.022 1.09 1.56 2.28 0.022 0.025 0.016
2011-03-19 61 0.98 1.59 2.08 0.030 0.032 0.027 1.25 1.85 2.25 0.024 0.024 0.023
2011-06-18 62 0.92 1.48 2.11 0.026 0.029 0.019 1.20 1.72 2.27 0.022 0.025 0.017
2011-09-17 62 0.94 1.07 1.96 0.032 0.029 0.039 1.19 1.31 2.18 0.029 0.028 0.033
2011-12-17 63 0.48 1.02 2.03 0.039 0.043 0.029 0.77 1.32 2.23 0.030 0.035 0.020
2012-03-17 60 0.67 1.44 2.14 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.93 1.69 2.31 0.016 0.017 0.014
2012-06-16 62 1.07 1.23 2.09 0.030 0.030 0.030 1.34 1.51 2.26 0.022 0.021 0.023
2012-09-22 67 0.91 1.64 2.17 0.025 0.025 0.023 1.20 1.87 2.33 0.022 0.021 0.023
2012-12-22 61 1.16 1.59 2.13 0.024 0.026 0.021 1.41 1.80 2.30 0.020 0.023 0.016
2013-03-16 55 1.05 1.73 2.13 0.021 0.018 0.027 1.33 1.97 2.32 0.016 0.013 0.020
2013-06-22 67 1.25 1.67 2.08 0.017 0.016 0.020 1.49 1.89 2.27 0.014 0.013 0.016
2013-09-21 62 0.99 1.56 2.16 0.020 0.019 0.020 1.24 1.80 2.34 0.014 0.014 0.015
2013-12-21 63 1.18 1.72 2.14 0.019 0.016 0.026 1.42 1.94 2.33 0.015 0.012 0.020
2014-03-22 60 1.30 1.68 2.20 0.021 0.018 0.027 1.55 1.93 2.35 0.015 0.014 0.015
2014-06-21 62 1.25 1.73 2.19 0.018 0.018 0.020 1.51 1.96 2.36 0.014 0.014 0.013
2014-09-20 62 1.40 1.79 2.19 0.019 0.017 0.021 1.66 2.02 2.35 0.014 0.014 0.014
2014-12-20 63 1.36 1.72 2.10 0.022 0.020 0.027 1.62 1.95 2.32 0.018 0.017 0.021
Average 62 0.94 1.41 2.09 1.19 1.65 2.27
Table 2 reports the level of both measures of information, Shannon and Rényi entropy, at three points in each option's life-cycle, 3-months, 2-months, and 1-day
from maturity, as well as the standard deviation of each measure of information over that respective month.
Table 2: Entropy Summary Statistics
Level Shannon Standard Deviation Level Rényi Standard Deviation
 
 
Figure 2: Level of Information 
 
Figure 2 reports the level of Shannon, , and Rényi, , entropy for each of 24 option 
chains over their 3-month life cycles. Each bar represents the initial 3-month (lower bound), 
2-months (center dot), and final 1-day (upper bound) level of information over time.  
 
5 Estimation  
5.1 Semiparametric 
Two features distinguish the following estimation from earlier work; 1. a 
focus on the evolution of the risk-neutral density over an option’s life cycle, 
and 2. a fully nonparametric estimation technique. These features are dis-
cussed briefly now. 
Nonparametric estimation places no restrictions on the shape of the density 
function, and makes no assumptions on the dynamics of an underlying asset’s 
 
 
price. Applying the original Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) method requires 
only the assumption that markets are competitive, and that the call price 
function is twice differentiable. Yet in much of the literature, semiparametric 
methods are preferred. The reasoning for this is twofold. First, semiparametric 
techniques are easier to estimate and require fewer assumptions than para-
metric methods. Second, semiparametric methods are thought to produce es-
timates of the density that are smoother and more interpretable than nonpar-
ametric techniques.  
Semiparametric methods require the interpolation and extrapolation of ob-
served option prices. Since prices are available for only a finite number of 
discreet strikes, the call function must first be interpolated across strike-prices. 
Popular methods, such as those following Shimko (1993), begin by converting 
prices to implied volatilities and interpolating the volatility ‘smile’. The inter-
polated smile is then converted back into prices. This process produces a con-
tinuous and twice-differentiable call price function, but introduces additional 
pricing errors. Furthermore, substantial effort must be exerted to choose a 
curve fitting method that minimize the added pricing errors while also pro-
ducing an estimate of the density function that is sufficiently smooth (Jondeau 
and Rockinger (2000) and Campa, Chang, and Refalo (2002)). 
Semiparametric methods may also require the interpolated function to be 
extrapolated beyond the observed strike prices to ensure the estimated prob-
abilities form a sufficient density, that is, sum to one. If so, another choice 
must be made of how to extrapolate either the interpolated call price function 
 
 
or volatility smile, and additional effort must be exerted to minimize addi-
tional errors (Datta, Londono, and Ross, 2014). This is often required because 
prices are not observed for a sufficient range of strike prices, or the observed 
prices are not sufficiently liquid. Finally, options have fixed maturities, and 
do not mature every day. Therefore to generate a fixed-horizon density, as is 
common in the literature, requires interpolating the estimated functions not 
only across strikes, but across days. This may introduce further errors into 
the call price function, which requires additional tradeoffs between smooth-
ness and goodness-of-fit. 
The testing procedure employed here does not rely on a fixed-horizon esti-
mate of the density function. In a departure from the literature, the target of 
the estimation is the evolution of the risk-neutral density over an option’s life 
cycle, and not the day-to-day variation of the density for a fixed maturity. 
This is done for two reasons. First, targeting the dynamics removes the need 
for further interpolation of the call price function, and second, the approach 
permits a simple testing procedure for the presence of jumps in the evolution 
of the density. As a result, the nonparametric estimation does not require the 
interpolation or the extrapolation of prices across either strikes or time. 
 
5.2 Nonparametric 
Recall that the buyer of a call option has the right to buy the underlying 
asset on a predetermined date ( ) and for a predetermined price ( ). The 
 
 
date is known as the expiration or maturity date, and the price as the exercise 
or strike price. A European call option cannot be excised before its maturity 
date. The payoff function of European call is then:  
 
max(0, − ) (5.1)
 
If the settlement price of the underlying index is less than a given strike, 
≤ , then the option will not be exercised and its value at time  is 0. 
Alternatively, if the price of the index is greater than a given strike, > , 
then the option is worth  –  at time T. At time < , or , the price of 
a European call option is then: 
 
( , , ) = − ∗[ max( − , 0) | , ] (5.2) 
= − max( − , 0) ( ) (5.2) 
= − max( − , 0) ( )   
 
Given payoff function (5.1), the price of an option is equivalent to the ex-
pected value of its payoff under the risk-neutral measure, ∗, where ( ) 
is the risk-neutral probability, and −  is the discount factor. Here  is the 
time  or terminal distribution of returns of the underlying asset, conditional 
 
 
on the observed price of its derivative at time < . Intuitively, Q is the 
aggregate “belief” of the market in the distribution of the future returns of 
the asset at time . Here  is the target of our nonparametric estimation. 
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) first showed that there exists a unique 
relationship between option prices and the risk-neutral density. Given the 
price function of a European call option ( , ) or  for simplicity, the 
second derivative with respect to its strike price  is the discounted proba-




− ( )  (5.3)
∂
∂ =
= − ( ) (5.4)
 
The result suggests the second derivative of the call price function can be 
used to estimate the risk-neutral density from observed option prices. How-
ever, as Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) noted, the estimation is very unsta-
ble, as small errors in observed prices are exacerbated by numerically differ-
encing twice. Typically these errors are small and do not represent a serious 
mispricing of the option or any arbitrage opportunities, and are usually a 
result of observing nonsynchronous prices. This problem however is not unique 
to lower frequency studies. Even at high-frequencies, I do not observe prices 
for all options simultaneously. The estimation therefore faces two challenges: 
 
 
1. A finite number of observed strikes, often at non-regular intervals, and 2. 
nonsynchronous pricing errors.  
 
5.3 Butterfly Option 
The intuition behind the original procedure is straightforward. Consider any 
two options with adjacent strikes, the difference in their price must reflect the 
probability of the final price of the underlying asset falling between them. 
This fact holds across strikes, and price differences must reflect the probability 
of the different outcomes. This fact can be used to extract the targeted prob-
ability measure, . 
Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) first formalized the intuition of how option 
prices may be used to mimic such state-contingent claims. The result is an 
elementary security whose return depends on the ‘state’ of the world at a 
particular time  in the future. Their key insight was that the price of such 
a claim would reflect investors’ assessment of the probability of that state 
occurring. Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) later showed how traded options 
can be combined across strikes to mimic such an Arrow-Debreu security. The 
goal is to construct a security which pays $1 at time  if the underlying asset 
takes a value, , and $0 otherwise, using options with the same expiration 
date and underlying asset.  
Recall that given the price of an asset , a single European call option 
with strike price  pays max(0, − ) at maturity > , and at any given 
 
 
time, , we can observe  call prices for , for = 1,… ,  options written 
on  across, , for = 1, . . ,  strike prices. These options can be combined 
to mimic an Arrow-Debreu security as follows: 
First, suppose I buy 1
− −1
 call options with strike price −  and simul-
taneously sell the same number of call options with strike price . The cost 
(5.5) of such a trade would be  −1−− −1, and at maturity I would receive a 
payout of (5.6). Such a trade is commonly known as a bull spread.  
 
= − −− −
 (5.5)





⎧  1 if ≥
  0 if ≤ −




At the same time, suppose I sell another 1
+1−
 call options with strike 
price  and buy the same number of options with strike price + . The cost 
(5.7) of the trade would be  − +1
+1−
, and at maturity I would again receive a 













⎧ −1 if ≥ +
0 if ≤




The combination of these two trades is known as butterfly option or spread, 
and it has the following properties. First, the payout of the combined option 
(5.9) is $0 for both ≤ −  and for ≥ + , since in the first instance 
neither option is exercised, and in the second, the bull option pays $1 and the 
bear option pays −$1. Second, the spread is linearly increasing in − ≤
≤ , as only the first option is exercised. Likewise the option is linearly 
decreasing in ≤ ≤ + , as both options are exercised. Finally, the 
option will have a payout equal to $1 for any = , and the cost or price, 
, of setting up the butterfly is (5.10).  
 
 =  
⎩
⎨
⎧    0   if ≤ −
Increasing  if − ≤ ≤
 1   if =
Decreasing if ≤ ≤ +
    0   if ≥ +
 (5.9) 
  







The result is an approximate Arrow-Debreu security, and the price, , of 
constructing such an option centered at  can be shown to be proportional 
to the risk-neutral probability of that state occurring (Ross 1976). Here no 
interpolation is required, and it is possible to construct the spread using only 
the available options. In summary, an individual butterfly spread is a near 
binary option, whose price has point mass  in .  
To approximate the entire density from these simple functions, notice that 
it is always possible to construct a series of butterfly options across any range 
of strikes  and , that is, one option centered at each , for = , . . ,  
strike prices. The resulting sum of their payouts has the following properties; 
$0 for ≤ − , ≥ + , $1 for = , + ,… , , and piecewise 
linear in between. Since at maturity  is a single point, the payout for the 
sum of butterflies must be smaller than [ − + ] and larger than [ ], 
making it an increasing sequence of simple or step functions. Recall that any 
non-negative measurable function can be shown to be the pointwise limit of 
a sequence of such non-negative monotonically increasing simple functions.  
 
sup| − − | → 0 (5.11) 
 
In other words, it can be shown that as (5.11) tends to zero, the payoff 
function of the butterfly option tends to a Dirac delta function with its mass 
at = . In the limit, the constructed butterfly is equivalent to an Arrow-
 
 
Debreu security paying $1 if =  and $0 for all other states, ≠ . 
Assuming the target measure has a continuous cumulative distribution func-
tion, a measure constructed from functions with point mass  in  can be 
shown to be a very good approximation of the risk-neutral density. 
For the sample of SPX options employed, the difference between available 
 is typically $5, and here I only use options spaced at intervals of $25 or 
less. If we assume condition (5.11) is fulfilled, it is then possible to work with 
the measures based , and its modifications. Note that for convenience, I 
choose to work with the logarithmic scale of this measure, such that (25) <
1.4. After applying the log-transform, the result is a measure with point mass 
 in ( ). 
 
5.4 Convolution 
In the previous section, the price of a combination of butterfly options was 
shown to be a point mass approximation of the risk-neutral density. The goal 
then is to convert this point mass approximation to a continuous density 
function. This is complicated by the likely presence of nonsynchronous pricing 
errors in the data. 
If the observed prices  contain even small pricing errors, equation (5.10) 
will be highly unstable. This is intuitive since the butterfly spread divides the 
difference of prices  by the difference of strikes , which are already as-
sumed to be small. In practice then, I observe , the estimated cost of the 
 
 
butterfly spread including pricing errors, and not . To recover , I consult 
the literature on inverse problems in econometrics and choose to approximate 
the measure as the convolution of  and a smoothing function . Convolu-
tions also play a central role in the identification and estimation of measure-
ment error models (Schennach 2016, 2019). Beyond econometrics, they have 
broad applications in statistics, physics, engineering, acoustics, image pro-
cessing, and probability theory. In statistics, a convolution is a weighted mov-
ing average. In kernel density estimation, a distribution can be approximated 
from its sample points by a convolution with a kernel (Diggle 1995). 
 
= + ε  (5.12) 
  
 
( ) = ( − log )
= ( − log ) + ( − log ) 
(5.13) 
 
Following Carrasco, Florens, and Renault (2014), a convolution is employed 
to reduce the noise in  and dampen the estimation error of . Consider any 
non-negative function  such that ∫ ( ) = 1, the convolution of  and  
is the function  as defined in (5.13), where  has the following two compo-
nents. First, a systematic component, ∑ ( − log ), here the density of 
a convolution of the constructed measure  with smoothing function . Sec-
ond, an idiosyncratic component, ∑ ( − log ), which can be shown to 
 
 
converge to zero under reasonable conditions; that is,  is three times differ-
entiable, square integrable, and the pricing errors have only short-range de-
pendence and are sufficiently tame. Stated simply, given a choice of smoothing 
function , if the pricing errors are not too large and not too persistent then 
 will be a good approximation of the continuous risk-neutral measure.  
A few final thoughts. First, here the choice of smoothing function is the 
density of a (0, 6.25 × 10− ), and  is therefore three times differentiable 
and square integrable. Second, the target of the remaining investigation is the 
information contained in the convolution  of the approximate risk-neutral 
measure with this smoothing function. Third, there is no guarantee that this 
 will be positive. In practice however, the contribution of the negative por-
tion of <  0 to the total variation of the measure is typically small, less 
than 10−  with few exceptions. Finally, the convolution can be shown to pre-
serve the higher order moments, and therefore the nonlinearities, of the esti-
mated density.  
 
5.5 Initial Estimates 
Figures 3 and 4 report the results of the nonparametric estimation proce-
dure. Figure 3 reports the evolution of the intraday measures of information 
for each option chain covering six years, 2009-2014. The 5-minute entropy 
measures are shaded in grey, and their 1-hour moving average in black, the 
index = ( − )/  normalizes each option’s life cycle. 
 
 
Figure 4 reports the intraday evolution of the approximate risk-neutral 
measure  as the convolution of , the estimated cost of the sum of butterfly 
options, and , a chosen smoothing function. The estimated densities  for 
the SPX options expiring in June 2014 are shown in color for a single day, 
May 30th, 2014, and for 83 5-minute intervals beginning at 08:25 and ending 
15:15 Central Time. The moving average of , the price of the sum of but-
terfly option, is shown in grey. Here  is an estimate of a measure with point 
mass  in ( ). Table 2 reports the level of both measures of information, 
Shannon (5.14) and Rényi (5.15) entropy, at three points in each option's life, 
3-months, 2-months, and 1-day from maturity, as well as the standard devia-
tion of each measure of information over that respective month. 
 
              = ∫ ( ) log ( ) (5.14) 
  









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I now turn to the paper’s main empirical contribution, a simple testing 
procedure for the presence of jumps in the arrival of information. The ap-
proach reveals both the frequency and magnitude of jumps in investor expec-
tations, and permits the testing of several hypotheses. Building on the concept 
of information as a reduction in uncertainty surrounding the future price of 
the index, the arrival of information is reflected in the evolution of the risk-
neutral density. This process can be quantified using entropy. For options with 
the same maturity date, the density becomes more concentrated over time. 
Hence both measures of entropy will increase, as investors become increasingly 
certain of the likely distribution of future prices. Intuitively, less weight is 
place on options farther from the money, as the probability of large changes 
in the value of the underlying index declines near maturity.  
The evolution of the entropy of the risk-neutral density reflects the arrival 
of information. If information arrives continuously, if investors gain infor-
mation in small amounts, or if expectations of the future price evolve slowly, 
then entropy will increase gradually. Alternatively, if information arrives dis-
continuously, if investors gain information in large amounts, or if expectations 
of the future price change abruptly, then entropy will be shown to jump. This 
intuition can be formalized by specifying the dynamics of the underlying dif-
fusion process. For example, if the underlying price were to follow a geometric 
 
 
Brownian motion, then the entropy of the implied distribution would increase 
both continuously and at a constant rate across time.  
The information theoretic framework introduces several testable hypotheses 
for how information drives the evolution of the risk-neutral density. First, 
information arrives continuously, and investors respond by constantly adjust-
ing expectations; or information arrives discreetly, and investors update ex-
pectations in response to new information. Second, investors learn at a con-
stant rate and information accrues consistently across the life cycle; or learn-
ing is highly variable, and information accrues at different rates across time. 
Third, information accrual is deterministic, and any shock to expectations 
will return to some trend; or information follows a random walk, and investors 
learn little day-to-day as shocks affect expectations indefinitely.  
The results of these hypothesis tests have real-world implications. Consider 
a temporary negative shock to the expected future value of the index. If in-
formation follows a stochastic trend, then investors remain persistently less 
certain about the future value of the index. This uncertainty may persist until 
an option matures. Alternatively, if uncertainty is purely deterministic, inves-
tors may profit from betting information will rebound to normal levels. Like-
wise, if information accrues at a constant rate, or if information is found to 
arrive continuously, investors may try to anticipate how uncertainty and the 
density function will evolve following a shock. Here it is important to consider 
that any model which assumes the underlying price follows a continuous dif-
fusion process also implicitly assumes that information arrives continuously, 
 
 
accrues at a constant rate, and evolves following a deterministic trend. This 
fact can be shown for many models including the famous Black-Scholes-Mer-
ton model. 
Testing the three hypotheses is equivalent to testing for jumps in a nonsta-
tionary time series. Here I follow the procedure proposed by Zivot and An-
drews (1992) to test for a single jump at an unknown time. The procedure 
derives from the literature on testing for unit roots in economic time series, 
beginning with Dickey and Fuller (1979), and generalized by Said and Dickey 
(1984). Perron (1989) found the proposed augmented Dickey–Fuller procedure 
to be biased against rejecting the null hypothesis in the presence of jumps or 
structural breaks in the time series. Zivot and Andrews (1992) later en-
dogenize Perron’s procedure to test for jumps occurring at an unknown time. 
The choice of procedure is threefold. First the test is simple and transparent. 
It is fast and easy to implement using standard econometric tools and soft-
ware, and the results are easy to interpret. Second, the procedure reveals the 
frequency, magnitude, and timing of each jump, three items of immediate 
interest in our analysis. And finally, the procedure provides a statistical test 
for each identified jump, a feature many event-type studies lack. I now turn 
to describing the procedure in detail.  
Following Zivot and Andrews (1992), the null hypothesis (6.1) is a random 
walk with possible drift and no jump. The alternative hypothesis (6.2) is a 
trend-stationary process with a single jump in its trend occurring at an un-
known time. The basic idea is to first estimate a sequence of alternative or 
 
 
trend-stationary models, one for each interval in the series. I then select the 
jump which gives the most weight to a single alternative model, and test that 
model against the null hypothesis. Here Zivot and Andrews follow Perron’s 
(1989) augmented Dickey–Fuller testing strategy, and use a single regression 
equation to test for a unit root. Operationally, their procedure identifies both 
the timing and magnitude of the single largest jump in each time series. Each 
regression also includes an optimal number of lags, typically chosen by either 
Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian Information Criterion or a sequence of t-tests. 
 
Null Hypothesis—Random Walk with Drift:  
:    = + − +  (6.1)
  
Alternative Hypothesis—Trend Stationary Model + Jump:  
:    = + + ( − ) + (6.2)
 
The number of lags included in each regression is chosen to reduce the re-
siduals to white noise. The optimal number included is allowed to vary for 
each candidate model, and is selected for each regression by a sequence of t-
tests, as suggested by Ng and Perron (1995) and Campbell and Perron (1991). 
Ng and Perron find their approach suffers fewer size distortions and retains 
comparable power to Schwarz’s (1978) Information Criteria. In practice both 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Perron (1989) follow such a procedure; working 
backward from = ̅ to = 0, selecting the first ∗ such that the t-stat on 
 
 
 for  <   is significant. It is their procedure I follow here, setting ̅ =
 floor [12{(T + 1)/100} ] as proposed by Schwert (1989), where = 83 and 
in practice ̅ = 11.  
 
Regression Model—Zivot and Andrews (1992): 
 
 
= μ̂ + θ̂  λ + δ̂ + α̂ − + = Δ − +  
(6.3)
  
The regression model (6.3) facilitates the testing of several hypotheses. In 
the model, {y } represents the amount of information measured at each in-
terval, where ∈ (0,83) is the number of 5-minute intervals after 08:25 Central 
Time. The “trend” parameter δ̂  measures the gain in information as the av-
erage change in entropy over each day. The intercept μ̂ captures the initial 
level of information for each trading day. The “jump” parameter θ ̂captures 
the magnitude of a one-time shift in level of information occurring at a single 
time, , where  is indicator variable such that  λ̂ = 1 if  >  , 
and 0 otherwise. The Zivot and Andrews (1992) procedure is to first estimate 
a sequence of models, one for each possible jump, and to then select the best 
alternative model from that class of candidate models. The ‘best’ being the 
model which gives the most weight to the alternative hypothesis. Finally, the 
null hypothesis, ŷ − = 1, is tested against the best alternative model, using 
the asymptotic critical values derived by Zivot and Andrews (1992). In prac-
tice, the alternative model is selected from the group of candidate models as 
 
 
the single model having the smallest one-sided t-statistic against the null for 
the test of α̂ = 1. Testing θ̂ U  λ̂ = 0 effectively tests for a jump at a given 
5-minute interval; where ̂ = /  for ∈ (7, T − 2) and solves inf
∈
(λ). 
In the application here, I begin with the two measures of information; Shan-
non and Rényi entropy. Both are measured at each of 83 5-minute intervals 
each day, over six years or 1,479 days in the sample, and representing 24 non-
overlapping option chains. For each day, I estimate the regression model at 
each of 73 candidate intervals, one for 5-minute intervals between the hours 
of 09:00 and 15:00 Central Time. From the resulting class of 73 candidate 
models I select the alternative model which best fits the data, here the model 
with the smallest t-statistic for the test of α̂ = 1. Finally, the random walk 
model is tested against the alternative trend-stationary model. The θ ̂and δ̂  
parameters are recorded for each day, along with the number of lags ∗ se-
lected, and the result of the main hypothesis test. For days where the null is 
rejected, a secondary test of θ̂ = 0 is performed to identify large jumps. 
Much of the following analysis focuses on relative magnitude of the “trend” 
or δ̂  and the “jump” or θ ̂parameters. It may be helpful then to review the 
possible outcomes of the testing procedure and the implication of each result 
for the analysis. First, for a given day the procedure may fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of a random walk. This would be the most likely outcome for 
days where the estimated time trend was very small, and no jump was iden-
tified. This result would indicate a day where little to no information was 
 
 
gained. Second, the procedure could reject the null hypothesis but detect no 
jump, such that δ̂ > θ.̂ This result would indicate a day where the trend or 
continuous gain in information dominates the arrival of any single bit of in-
formation. This result is most consistent with the model of the evolution of 
an asset’s price as a continuous diffusion process. In practice, information is 
shown to arrive nearly continuously, and investors respond by making con-
stant small adjustments in their expectations of the future price of the asset. 
Finally, for a given day, the procedure may reject the null hypothesis and 
detect a jump. This result would indicate a day with a large discreet gain in 
information, a jump which may dominate the more continuous gain in infor-
mation, such that θ̂ > δ̂ . Here information is shown to arrive discreetly, and 
investors respond by making large revisions to their expectations. 
 
7 Results 
7.1 Full Sample 
The testing procedure reveals several surprising results. Information is 
shown to often arrive in discrete intervals. Even at high-frequencies the risk-
neutral density can be shown to jump. In the data, the procedure identifies 
at least one jump for a majority of days, and finds days without jumps con-
tribute little to the total gain in information. Additionally, the testing proce-
dure reveals both the frequency and magnitude of jumps in investor expecta-
tions. The findings highlight two facts new to the literature. First, the 
 
 
majority of information accrues in the final month of an option’s life cycle. In 
fact, investors learn little about the future price of an asset for most of an 
option’s life. Second, jumps contribute the majority of information gained 
during the first two months. Only in the final month does information arrive 
often enough for the trend to contribute more to the total gained. The size 
and frequency of jumps does not decline. 
Information arrives in discrete intervals. The intraday analysis reveals the 
frequent occurrence of jumps in the risk-neutral density. Table 3 and Table 4 
summarize the results of the daily Zivot and Andrews (1992) procedure for 
each of 24 option chains. Each table displays the results of the daily hypothesis 
test of α̂ = 1. In columns 3-5, I report the total number of days for each chain 
where the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level. On average, the null hypothesis is rejected for a majority of 
days, and the alternative model of a trend-stationary process with a potential 
one-time jump in information is selected. This is true for between one-half 
and two-thirds of days depending on the measure of entropy and the level of 
significance. The result implies that investors 1. gain information about the 
future value of an asset over time, and 2. make large revisions to their expec-
tations in response to new information. This is shown to occur even at high 
frequencies, as the procedure identifies at least one jump for a majority of 
days. The results also document several days where little to no information is 
gained. For days where the procedure fails to reject the null, no jumps are 
 
 
found to have occurred. Combined with only a small gain in the trend of 
information, the daily process for these days would resemble a random walk. 
Tables 3 and 4 also report the average daily change in total, trend, and 
jump estimates of information, taken over all days in each option chain, in 
columns 6-8. On average, the day-to-day gain in information is small, and 
positive; with a trend component that is on average larger than either the 
jump or total gain in information. On average jumps appear to coincide more 
with increases in uncertainty, as they are negative and nonzero. This holds 
for both Shannon and Rényi entropies.  
The final two columns report the average daily contribution of jump and 
trend estimates as a percentage of the total gain in information. Here it be-
comes apparent that jumps contribute to a large proportion of the total in-
formation gained, and are more often positive than their average over all days 
appears. On average, jumps contribute almost half of the total information 
gained over the cycle. Across all days, a single jump, over a single 5-minute 
interval, is nearly as large as the estimated trend across the entire day. This 
result implies that jumps occur for a majority of days, and that days without 
jumps likely contribute little to the total gain in information. 
The testing procedure reveals the magnitude of jumps in investor expecta-
tions. Figures 5 panels 2 and 3 present histograms of the estimated daily trend 
and jump components for all days, and each measure of entropy. The trend 
component is unimodal, centered near zero, and negatively skewed. The trend 
in Shannon entropy is more broadly distributed and more skewed in 
 
 
comparison to the trend in Rényi entropy. The estimated jump component is 
bimodal, centered near zero, slightly positively skewed, and not symmetric. 
The jumps in Shannon entropy are more broadly distributed and skewed com-
pared to the Rényi entropy. For both measures, there are few days where the 
estimated jump is zero, and a large number of days the jump component is 
larger than the trend. To understand how the trend and jump components 
vary day-to-day, Figure 5 panels 1 and 4 present heat maps of the estimated 
daily trend and jump components for all days. For each map, the bright yellow 
and deep blue correspond to estimates of the daily trend and jump above the 
95th percentile of each distribution, with blue-green estimates near zero.  
Several patterns emerge that require further consideration. First, the size 
and frequency of jump estimates appears evenly distributed over the life cycle. 
Second, the magnitude of the trend estimate is not evenly distributed. Look-
ing at the shading in panels 1 and 4 of both figures, a large positive trend 
appears more likely in the final 20 to 30 days of an option’s life. This result 
suggests information accrues at different rates across time, that is, gains in 
information are not constant across the life cycle. Figure 6 panels 1 and 2 
shows this in high contrast. Here, days with a strictly positive trend and jump 
are reported in white. Again the frequency of positive jumps appears evenly 
distributed over the life cycle, while the frequency of days with a strictly 
positive trend seems to concentrate in the final 20 days of an option’s life.  
 
Maturity Days 10 5 1 Total Trend Jump Trend Jumps
2009-03-21 53 24 21 15 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.56 0.44
2009-06-20 62 31 28 15 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.52 0.48
2009-09-19 62 40 35 23 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.51 0.49
2009-12-19 63 40 38 31 0.006 0.011 -0.004 0.51 0.49
2010-03-20 60 39 38 23 0.006 0.008 -0.003 0.53 0.47
2010-06-19 62 29 23 16 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.54 0.46
2010-09-18 62 29 25 19 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.48 0.52
2010-12-18 63 47 41 31 0.004 0.008 -0.004 0.52 0.48
2011-03-19 61 34 29 19 0.006 0.008 -0.001 0.50 0.50
2011-06-18 62 37 32 23 0.002 0.007 -0.005 0.51 0.49
2011-09-17 62 26 21 13 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.51 0.49
2011-12-17 63 45 42 36 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.48 0.52
2012-03-17 60 41 39 27 0.003 0.010 -0.007 0.44 0.56
2012-06-16 62 37 35 25 0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.48 0.52
2012-09-22 67 39 34 26 0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.50 0.50
2012-12-22 61 40 36 32 -0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.46 0.54
2013-03-16 55 41 39 34 0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.51 0.49
2013-06-22 67 41 36 19 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.55 0.45
2013-09-21 62 53 49 41 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.51 0.49
2013-12-21 63 46 44 35 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.54 0.46
2014-03-22 60 48 46 39 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.54 0.46
2014-06-21 62 50 46 43 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.48 0.52
2014-09-20 62 40 39 24 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.51 0.49
2014-12-20 63 46 43 30 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.47 0.53
Average 62 39 36 27 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.51 0.49
Table 3 reports the results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) testing procedure for the Shannon measure of information. Columns 3-5, report
the total number of days where the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Columns 6-8 report the
average daily change in total, trend, and jump estimates of information. The final two columns report the average daily contribution of jump
and trend estimates as a percentage of the total gain in information.
Table 3: Test Results Shannon Entropy
Reject Null Average Daily Change Percent Total Change
Maturity Days 10 5 1 Total Trend Jump Trend Jumps
2009-03-21 53 24 20 8 0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.55 0.45
2009-06-20 62 22 21 16 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.54 0.46
2009-09-19 62 38 30 22 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.54 0.46
2009-12-19 63 39 36 23 0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.53 0.47
2010-03-20 60 30 27 16 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.54 0.46
2010-06-19 62 23 20 15 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.54 0.46
2010-09-18 62 28 25 14 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.47 0.53
2010-12-18 63 40 31 22 0.004 0.009 -0.005 0.52 0.48
2011-03-19 61 36 33 25 0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.52 0.48
2011-06-18 62 29 27 18 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.50 0.50
2011-09-17 62 19 14 8 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.51 0.49
2011-12-17 63 35 32 22 0.004 0.014 -0.009 0.52 0.48
2012-03-17 60 39 35 28 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.47 0.53
2012-06-16 62 30 26 14 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.48 0.52
2012-09-22 67 29 28 21 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.50 0.50
2012-12-22 61 30 27 17 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 0.48 0.52
2013-03-16 55 30 26 19 0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.51 0.49
2013-06-22 67 32 25 16 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.53 0.47
2013-09-21 62 40 38 27 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.53 0.47
2013-12-21 63 34 30 21 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.53 0.47
2014-03-22 60 37 37 23 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.50 0.50
2014-06-21 62 39 33 26 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.53 0.48
2014-09-20 62 34 31 22 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.52 0.48
2014-12-20 63 36 30 21 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.47 0.53
Average 62 32 28 19 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.51 0.49
Table 4: Test Results Rényi Entropy
Reject Null Average Daily Change Percent Total Change
Table 4 reports the results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) testing procedure for the Rényi measure of information. Columns 3-5, report the
total number of days where the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Columns 6-8 report the average
daily change in total, trend, and jump estimates of information. The final two columns report the average daily contribution of jump and trend
estimates as a percentage of the total gain in information.
 
 




Figure 5 panels 2 and 3 present histograms of the estimated daily trend and jump components for all 
days, and each measure of entropy, both Shannon, , and Rényi, ; panels 1 and 4 present heat 
maps of the estimated daily trend and jump components for all days. 
 
The result is even more pronounced if we focus only on the last two weeks, or 
10 days, of trading. Few days in the last two weeks of an option’s life report 
a negative trend. In contrast, the magnitude and frequency of jumps does not 
appear to change. 
When then is information gained? Figure 6 panel 3 reports the frequency of 
days where the trend is larger than the estimated jump for both measures of 
entropy. Note that there are many days where the trend exceeds the estimated 
jump, and Figure 6 panel 3 does not distinguish days where both are negative 
 
 
or near zero from days where the trends is large and positive. However, when 
viewed in conjunction with Figure 6 panels 1 and 2 it becomes more apparent 
that information does not accrue consistently across the life cycle. Only in the 
final 10-20 days of an option’s life cycle is the estimated trend persistently 
positive, and consistently larger than the estimated jumps. This explains 
many of the results in Tables 3 and 4. If for the majority of days the daily 
 




Figure 6 panels 1 and 2 shows days with a strictly positive trend and jump reported in white for both 
measures of information, Shannon, , and Rényi,  entropy. Panel 3 reports the frequency of 
days where the trend is larger than the estimated jump. Panel 4 reports the days where the null 




gain in information is small, then jumps may contribute much to the gain in 
information. This effect would be particularly acute if days without jumps 
were found to contribute little to the total gained. 
Figure 6 panel 4 reports the days where the null hypothesis of a random 
walk is rejected, in a test of α̂ = 1. Again it can be seen that jumps are quite 
common, and that the alternative model is selected more often in the final 
month of an option’s life. Indeed, days where little to no information is learned 
(days where the test fails to reject the null) appear concentrated in the first 
two month of the sample. Given that the trend is less pronounced during this 
period, days without jumps likely contribute little to the total gain in infor-
mation during much of an option’s early life. This is not to say that infor-
mation commonly follows a random walk, or to suggest investors learn nothing 
day-to-day. No, information accrual is decidedly deterministic. The trend is 
small, but I find little evidence that shocks affect expectations or the level of 
information indefinitely.  
Taken together, the initial results suggest learning is highly variable, and 
information about the final price of the asset accrues at different rates across 
time. The findings contradict the assumption that investors are less certain 
about the future price of an asset mostly as a function of time, something a 
continuous diffusion process implicitly assumes. Instead, the arrival of infor-
mation in discreet intervals results in jumps in the level of uncertainty. This 
fact, combined with a small trend for much of an options life cycle, and var-
ying levels of initial uncertainty, explains the results of Tables 3 and 4. To 
 
 
verify this intuition, I turn to the question of quantifying these differences 
across the life cycle. 
 
7.2 Split Sample 
The following findings highlight two facts new to the literature. First, the 
majority of information accrues in the final month of an option’s life cycle. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show that on average nearly 60 percent of gain in entropy 
accrues in the final month. Given that this represents only one-third of an 
option’s life, the gain in information in the last month is both large and un-
expected. The finding suggests that investors learn little about the future 
price of an asset for much of an option’s life. This result runs contrary to the 
assumption that investors become more certain about the likely final price of 
an asset at close to a constant rate. The finding also raises new questions 
regarding what drives the differences in the rate of the accrual of information 
in the final month of an option’s life.  
Tables 5 and 6 document the source of the difference in the accrual rate of 
information. Each table reports the results of the intraday Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) procedure for each day of the 24 option chains. Here the sample is split 
into thirds, with the results of the unit root test and gains in information 
reported separately for the first 2 months and final 1 month of each option 
chain. On average there are 40 trading days in the first two months, and 21 
trading days in the final month; a ratio 2:1, representing on average 66 and 
 
 
34 percent of each life cycle. Column 3 reports the fraction of days in each 
subsample for each option. Each table displays the results of the daily hy-
pothesis test of α̂ = 1. In columns 4-6, I report the total number of days for 
each chain where the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent level. On average, the null hypothesis is rejected for a similar 
fraction of days in both subsamples, with the alternative model being selected 
for between one-half and two-third of days. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the average daily change in total, trend, and jump 
estimates of information for each period. Columns 7-9 report that the average 
day-to-day gain in information remains small and positive, but is noticeably 
larger during the final month of the sample. This holds for both Shannon and 
Rényi entropies. Indeed, the average trend estimate triples for the Shannon 
entropy and doubles for the Rényi entropy in the last month. In contrast, the 
average jump estimate does not change. Figure 7 demonstrates this result 
visually. Here I plot the average absolute trend and jump estimates for the 
first 2 months in white, and the final month in black. The results match those 
as reported in columns 8 and 9 respectively. In almost all cases the average 
trend for the last month of the life cycle is large and positive, particularly 
early on in the sample when the initial level of uncertainty is highest. By 
comparison, the average jump estimate does not appear systematically larger 
in final month. This result holds for both measures of information. 
 
Percent Contribution
Maturity Days Fraction 10 5 1 Total Trend Jump Trend Jumps
2009-03-21 33 0.62 18 17 12 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.54 0.46
20 0.38 6 4 3 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.58 0.42
2009-06-20 40 0.65 21 19 8 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.51 0.49
22 0.35 10 9 7 -0.004 0.002 -0.006 0.53 0.47
2009-09-19 40 0.65 24 22 14 0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.50 0.50
22 0.35 16 13 9 0.021 0.018 0.003 0.53 0.47
2009-12-19 42 0.67 29 28 24 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.55 0.45
21 0.33 11 10 7 0.003 0.014 -0.010 0.44 0.56
2010-03-20 40 0.67 24 23 16 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.52 0.48
20 0.33 15 15 7 0.013 0.021 -0.008 0.55 0.45
2010-06-19 40 0.65 21 16 12 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 0.49 0.51
22 0.35 8 7 4 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.63 0.37
2010-09-18 40 0.65 23 21 16 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.44 0.56
22 0.35 6 4 3 0.011 0.013 -0.003 0.54 0.46
2010-12-18 42 0.67 31 27 20 0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.50 0.50
21 0.33 16 14 11 0.013 0.016 -0.003 0.54 0.46
2011-03-19 42 0.69 24 20 11 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.49 0.51
19 0.31 10 9 8 0.003 0.015 -0.012 0.52 0.48
2011-06-18 40 0.65 26 23 18 0.001 0.009 -0.008 0.48 0.52
22 0.35 11 9 5 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.57 0.43
2011-09-17 40 0.65 14 11 7 -0.006 -0.007 0.001 0.52 0.48
22 0.35 12 10 6 0.029 0.026 0.003 0.50 0.50
2011-12-17 42 0.67 30 28 24 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.49 0.51
21 0.33 15 14 12 0.021 0.015 0.006 0.46 0.54
2012-03-17 40 0.67 29 28 20 0.002 0.013 -0.011 0.48 0.52
20 0.33 12 11 7 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.36 0.64
2012-06-16 40 0.65 27 26 21 0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.49 0.51
22 0.35 10 9 4 0.012 0.018 -0.006 0.47 0.53
2012-09-22 45 0.67 25 21 16 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 0.48 0.52
22 0.33 14 13 10 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.54 0.46
2012-12-22 40 0.66 20 17 14 -0.017 -0.003 -0.013 0.43 0.57
21 0.34 20 19 18 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.50 0.50
2013-03-16 36 0.65 24 23 19 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.49 0.51
19 0.35 17 16 15 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.56 0.44
2013-06-22 45 0.67 27 25 13 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.54 0.46
22 0.33 14 11 6 -0.001 -0.006 0.006 0.58 0.42
2013-09-21 40 0.65 33 31 28 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.52 0.48
22 0.35 20 18 13 0.009 0.011 -0.002 0.51 0.49
2013-12-21 42 0.67 29 29 22 0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.55 0.45
21 0.33 17 15 13 -0.002 0.006 -0.007 0.50 0.50
2014-03-22 40 0.67 30 28 23 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.53 0.47
20 0.33 18 18 16 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.55 0.45
2014-06-21 40 0.65 32 29 28 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.51 0.49
22 0.35 18 17 15 0.012 0.013 -0.001 0.43 0.57
2014-09-20 40 0.65 26 26 16 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.53 0.47
22 0.35 14 13 8 0.007 0.010 -0.003 0.47 0.53
2014-12-20 42 0.67 30 28 19 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.45 0.55
21 0.33 16 15 11 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.52 0.48
Averages
2-Month 40 0.66 26 24 18 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.50 0.50
1-Month 21 0.34 14 12 9 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.52 0.48
Reject Null Gain in Information
Table 5 reports the results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) testing procedure for the Shannon measure of information. Column 
3 reports the fraction of days in each subsample. Columns 4-6, report the total number of days where the null hypothesis of a
random walk is rejected at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Columns 7-9 report the average daily change in total, trend, and
jump estimates of information. The final two columns report the average daily contribution of jump and trend estimates as a
percentage of the total gain in information.
Table 5: Test Results Shannon Entropy Split Sample
Percent Contribution
Maturity Days Fraction 10 5 1 Total Trend Jump Trend Jumps
2009-03-21 33 0.62 16 14 8 0.006 0.009 -0.003 0.54 0.46
20 0.38 8 6 1 0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.58 0.42
2009-06-20 40 0.65 15 14 11 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.52 0.48
22 0.35 7 7 5 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.59 0.41
2009-09-19 40 0.65 24 17 14 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.54 0.46
22 0.35 14 13 8 0.014 0.012 0.002 0.53 0.47
2009-12-19 42 0.67 28 26 17 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.56 0.44
21 0.33 11 10 7 0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.48 0.52
2010-03-20 40 0.67 20 18 13 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.50 0.50
20 0.33 10 9 3 0.010 0.012 -0.002 0.62 0.38
2010-06-19 40 0.65 17 15 12 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.51 0.49
22 0.35 6 5 4 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.61 0.39
2010-09-18 40 0.65 21 18 10 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.41 0.59
22 0.35 7 7 5 0.007 0.010 -0.003 0.57 0.43
2010-12-18 42 0.67 27 19 14 0.003 0.011 -0.008 0.50 0.50
21 0.33 13 12 9 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.56 0.44
2011-03-19 42 0.69 26 25 20 0.007 0.009 -0.003 0.51 0.49
19 0.31 10 8 7 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.54 0.46
2011-06-18 40 0.65 23 21 14 0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.49 0.51
22 0.35 6 6 4 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.52 0.48
2011-09-17 40 0.65 11 7 3 -0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.49 0.51
22 0.35 8 7 5 0.017 0.019 -0.002 0.54 0.46
2011-12-17 42 0.67 26 25 19 0.004 0.012 -0.008 0.54 0.46
21 0.33 9 7 4 0.006 0.018 -0.012 0.49 0.51
2012-03-17 40 0.67 27 25 22 0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.48 0.52
20 0.33 12 10 7 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.45 0.55
2012-06-16 40 0.65 22 22 14 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.44 0.56
22 0.35 8 4 2 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.55 0.45
2012-09-22 45 0.67 16 15 12 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.48 0.52
22 0.33 13 13 10 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.52 0.48
2012-12-22 40 0.66 17 16 12 -0.016 -0.003 -0.013 0.45 0.55
21 0.34 13 11 7 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.54 0.46
2013-03-16 36 0.65 21 18 14 0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.51 0.49
19 0.35 9 8 7 0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.52 0.48
2013-06-22 45 0.67 21 14 8 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.50 0.50
22 0.33 11 11 8 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.59 0.41
2013-09-21 40 0.65 26 25 20 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.51 0.49
22 0.35 14 13 8 0.005 0.008 -0.003 0.58 0.42
2013-12-21 42 0.67 21 19 14 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.54 0.46
21 0.33 13 11 8 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.53 0.47
2014-03-22 40 0.67 24 24 16 0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.50 0.50
20 0.33 13 13 9 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.49 0.51
2014-06-21 40 0.65 28 22 16 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.55 0.45
22 0.35 11 11 10 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.48 0.52
2014-09-20 40 0.65 22 21 16 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.51 0.49
22 0.35 12 10 7 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.53 0.47
2014-12-20 42 0.67 23 19 13 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.45 0.55
21 0.33 13 11 8 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.50 0.50
Averages
2-Month 40 0.66 22 19 14 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.50 0.50
1-Month 21 0.34 10 9 6 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.54 0.46
Table 6 reports the results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) testing procedure for the Rényi measure of information. Column 3
reports the fraction of days in each subsample. Columns 4-6, report the total number of days where the null hypothesis of a
random walk is rejected at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Columns 7-9 report the average daily change in total, trend, and
jump estimates of information. The final two columns report the average daily contribution of jump and trend estimates as a
percentage of the total gain in information.
Reject Null Gain in Information
Table 6: Test Results Rényi Entropy Split Sample
 
 
Figure 7: Contribution to Gain 
 
 
Figure 7 reports the average absolute trend and jump estimates for the first 2 months in 
white, and the final month in black for Shannon, , and Rényi, , entropy. Figure 7 




Only in the final month does the trend contribute more to the total gained. 
The final two columns of Tables 5 and 6 report the average daily contribution 
of jump and trend estimates as a percentage of the total gain in information, 
across the first two and final months of the sample. On average, the trend 
contributes to a larger percentage gain in total information in the final month. 
As a result, jumps are shown to contribute a smaller percentage gain. That is 
not to say the importance of jumps diminishes. On average, a single jump 
continues to contribute nearly an equivalent amount of information as the 
estimated trend across the entire day. This effect is simply more pronounced 
earlier in the sample when the trend estimates are on average smaller.  
The testing procedure reveals the change in magnitude of the trend and 
jump estimates in the final month of an option’s life. Figure 8 present histo-
grams of the estimated daily trend and jump components for each subsample 
and measure of entropy. In panel 1, the trend and jumps in Shannon entropy 
are shown for all 3-months in white, and the final month in grey. Panel 2 
reports the trend and jumps in Shannon entropy for the first 2-months in 
white and the final month in grey. Looking across both panels, the shape of 
the distribution of jumps does not change in the final month of the sample. 
The shaded subsample remains bimodal, centered near zero, and slightly 
asymmetric. By comparison, the shape of the distribution of estimated trends 









Figure 8 reports the estimated daily trend and jump estimates for each subsample and measure of entropy. 
In panel 1 and 3, the trend and jumps in Shannon, , and Rényi, , entropy are shown for all 3-
months in white, and the final month in grey, respectively. Panels 2 and 4 reports the trend and jumps 
in Shannon entropy for the first 2-months in white and the final 1-month in grey. 
 
trend estimates remain unimodal, with the final month being negatively 
skewed and centered in the positive quadrant. This effect is most obvious in 
panel 2, where the occurrence or frequency of days with a large positive trend 
is near equal between the first two and final month of the sample, a counter-
intuitive result given the relative lengths of the subsamples. The finding sup-
ports the conclusion that a large positive trend occurs predominately in the 
final 20 days of an option’s life. Similar patterns emerge in the Rényi entropy. 
 
 
In panels 2 and 4, the contribution of the final month to the right tail of the 
histogram is pronounced. Both results suggest that the gain in information is 
not constant across the life cycle. Indeed, Figure 8 clearly shows that infor-
mation accrues at different rates across the life cycle. For good measure, Table 
7 reports the percentiles of the empirical cumulative distribution functions for 
panels 2 and 4, and Figure C in the appendix plots these functions. For both 
measures of entropy the estimated trend or continuous gain in information in 
the final month is on average larger, more frequent, and persistently more 
positive. Likewise, the estimated daily jumps or discreet gains in information 
are frequent, nonzero, and larger than the trend for many days. The result 
supports the conclusion that jumps contribute much to the total gain in in-
formation and, given the small trend, contribute the majority of information 
which accrues during the first two months. 
 
  
1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
Shannon Trend 3m -0.090 -0.052 -0.034 -0.013 0.005 0.024 0.047 0.061 0.090
Jumps -0.071 -0.039 -0.028 -0.017 -0.005 0.015 0.027 0.035 0.061
Rényi Trend 3m -0.063 -0.033 -0.023 -0.008 0.004 0.016 0.032 0.043 0.070
Jumps -0.050 -0.024 -0.018 -0.011 -0.003 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.043
Shannon Trend 2m -0.092 -0.055 -0.035 -0.014 0.003 0.020 0.042 0.055 0.087
1m -0.081 -0.049 -0.034 -0.013 0.009 0.031 0.050 0.068 0.132
Jumps 2m -0.079 -0.038 -0.027 -0.016 -0.003 0.014 0.026 0.036 0.056
1m -0.055 -0.040 -0.030 -0.018 -0.007 0.016 0.027 0.035 0.084
Rényi Trend 2m -0.062 -0.034 -0.022 -0.007 0.003 0.014 0.030 0.042 0.069
1m -0.064 -0.031 -0.023 -0.008 0.006 0.018 0.033 0.043 0.071
Jumps 2m -0.051 -0.027 -0.018 -0.010 -0.003 0.010 0.016 0.022 0.044
1m -0.039 -0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.003 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.041
Table 7: Gain in Information
Entropy Percentile
Table 7 reports the percentiles of the empirical cumulative distribution functions for the daily trend and jump estimates for each
subsample, full and split, and both measures of information, Shannon and Rényi entropy. Figure C in the appendix plots the cdfs.
 
 
8 Case Studies  
The results in the previous section demonstrate that information often ar-
rives in discreet intervals, and in response investors often make large revisions 
to their expectations. In this section, large jumps in entropy are used to iden-
tify events in which significant new information is revealed to investors. In a 
first application of these methods, the case study demonstrates the ability to 
identify, quantify, and test for the effect of new information on the beliefs of 
market participants at high frequencies. 
This section features three case studies, each highlighting a different cate-
gory of discreet events: speeches by individual policymakers, economic news 
announcements, and flash crashes in the price of the underlying index. The 
first case study features President Obama’s speech in January 2010 on tight-
ening regulations on US banks; Chairman Bernanke’s July 2010 testimony to 
Congress describing the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) economic 
outlook; and statements released by the FOMC in March 2009, September 
2012, and December 2013, each affecting their use of unconventional monetary 
policies. The second case study covers the introduction of the stimulus pack-
age passed by Congress in January 2009; the August 2011 deal to raise the 
US debt ceiling; and the deadlock in Congressional budget super committee 
in November 2011. The final case study highlights the May 2010 flash crash 
and the April 2013 Twitter crash, following reports of an explosion at the 
White House.  
 
 
The events in each study are distinguished by how the arrival of new infor-
mation affects uncertainty, whether market participants anticipated the infor-
mation, and whether the information’s effect on uncertainty was temporary 
or persistent. To identify these events, the largest jumps were selected from 
each of the 24 option chains. Concurrent jumps in both measures of infor-
mation were then compared to a simple Factiva news search to find events 
which correspond to the arrival of significant new information. Here, the fre-
quency and calendar span of the sample present two advantages. The high 
frequency allows us to identify the source of the new information, and the 
long calendar span allows us to compare the effect of that information to other 
events in the sample. The testing procedure introduced in Section 6 presents 
a third advantage, allowing us to test for jumps at an unknown time in the 
series. When used in conjunction with the frequency and span of the sample, 
the framework provides a novel way to identify, quantify, and test for the 
effect of new information on the beliefs of market participants. 
The events analyzed here were not pre-selected or assumed to have affected 
the distribution of investor expectations. In a departure from much of the 
event-study literature, a hypothesis test was used to identify days where the 
potential arrival of new information resulted in a large and sudden change in 
the level of uncertainty. The approach therefore differs from other high-fre-
quency event-studies, such as Goldberg and Grisse (2013) and Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), among others, who examine the response 
of interest rates and exchange rates to select economic news announcements. 
Desc Date Time ttm Trend Jump t-stat Time Pctile t-stat Trend Jump t-stat Time Pctile t-stat
President Obama 2010-01-21 10:35 41 0.004 -0.054 -6.26 09:25 98 -5.88 0.001 -0.033 -5.65 09:25 98 -5.51
Chairman Bernanke 2010-07-21 13:00 42 0.028 -0.035 -6.87 13:00 94 -6.25 0.013 -0.022 -6.30 13:00 95 -5.86
FOMC   QE I 2009-03-18 13:15 03 0.000 -0.031 -3.49 13:15 93 -5.50 0.005 -0.011 -1.92 13:00 78 -2.94
FOMC   QE III 2012-09-13 11:30 07 -0.034 0.084 7.02 11:40 99 -6.29 -0.014 0.037 8.28 11:35 98 -6.85
FOMC   Taper 2013-12-18 13:00 03 -0.036 0.102 4.45 13:50 99 -5.59 -0.044 0.082 7.65 13:10 99 -6.52
Stimulus package 2009-01-15 12:15-13:15 45 0.008 0.024 3.23 13:20 87 -5.82 0.002 0.022 4.12 12:40 95 -6.03
Debt ceiling 2011-08-01 08:30-09:00 34 0.020 -0.028 -4.29 09:00 91 -4.72 0.017 -0.023 -4.33 09:00 95 -4.77
Super committee 2011-11-17 11:00-11:30 21 0.046 -0.072 -3.20 11:25 99 -5.49 0.024 -0.083 -5.50 11:30 99 -6.13
Flash crash 2010-05-06 13:42 31 -0.094 -0.075 -3.73 13:35 99 -5.24 -0.101 -0.083 -3.15 13:35 99 -4.22
Twitter crash 2013-04-23 12:07 43 0.034 -0.027 -3.82 11:50 90 -6.72 0.059 -0.048 -6.35 12:05 99 -6.66
Case III—Flash Crashes
Table 8 reports a summary of the results for each case study. Columns 2-4 report the date, time, and time-to-maturity, in days, for the events
corresponding to large jumps in information. Columns 5 and 11 report estimates of the trend in Shannon and Rényi entropy for those days. Columns 6-
9 and 12-15 report estimates, timing, and percentiles of the identified jumps in information. Percentiles are in absolute value. Columns 10 and 16 report
the t-statistic for the test of the null of a random walk against the alternative, a trend stationary process with a single jump, for each day.
Case II—Legislatures
Table 8: Large Information Events




Table 8 reports the results of the testing procedure for each event in the 
three case studies. Figures 9-12 report the intraday evolution of information, 
the timing of the identified jump, and the intraday price of the underlying 
index and implied volatility index for each day. Figures D-G in the appendix 
report the t-statistics for each candidate model, the jump corresponding to 
the model with the minimum t-statistic, as well as the daily volume and price 
of the underlying index, and daily implied volatility for each option chain. 
The timing of all events is reported in Central Time (CT), -5 or -6 hours 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Percentiles are in absolute value. 
 
8.1 Policymakers 
The first of three categories of discreet events demonstrates how new infor-
mation arrives in the statements of key policymakers. The category includes 
speeches by both President Obama and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, and the release of three statements by the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC). The events are distinguished by their effect on uncer-
tainty, timing, and persistence. The case study presents evidence that signifi-
cant new information is revealed in the statements of policymakers, and that 
uncertainty may trend or jump in anticipation of large news events.  
When Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke began his semiannual re-
port before the Senate Banking Committee, shortly after 13:00 CT on July 
21, 2010, the S&P 500 was little changed for the day. Following his statement 
 
 
that the economic outlook remained ‘unusually uncertain’ the index quickly 
dropped 1 percent and would end the day down 1.3 percent. Here the effect 
of new information on expectations is clear. The testing procedure identifies 
a sharp increase in uncertainty coinciding with Chairman’s opening remarks. 
Figure 9 shows both measures of information decline suddenly at 13:00 and 
continue falling until 13:30. The event presents evidence that significant new 
information was revealed in the statement, as investors rapidly revised their 
expectations in response to the Chairman’s subdued forecast for the economic 
recovery. The effect was large and persistent. Neither Shannon nor Rényi en-
tropy recovered for the session. Table 8 reports estimates of theta as -0.035 
and -0.022 nats respectively, just below the 95th percentile for the sample, 
and nearly half of the observed decline in information for the day. Referring 
to Tables 3 and 4, this single jump is 10 times larger than the average gain in 
information over the entire day. 
The President’s speech began shortly before 10:40 CT on January 21, 2010. 
The day before, the S&P 500 had closed down 1.1 percent. At 07:30 that 
morning, initial jobless claims arrived at 482 thousand, higher than the 440 
thousand expected. At 09:00 the Philadelphia Fed’s Business Outlook index 
was released, declining to 15.2 and below expectations of 18. Against this 
economic backdrop, President Obama announced his intention that morning 
to strengthen financial regulation by introducing a “Volcker Rule” to limit the 
trading activities of large US banks. His speech lasted less than 10 minutes. 
The S&P closed down 1.9 percent later that day, led down by financial stocks.  
 
 




Figure 9 reports the results for the jumps identified on January 21, 2010 at 09:25 CT and July 21, 2010 
at 13:00 for both measures of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , and the 
intraday level of both the underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility or VIX Index. Panels 1 and 3 
report the fitted model for each entropy in black and the detected jump θ ̂in red.  
 
In comparison, the testing procedure identifies a sharp increase in uncer-
tainty just before 09:30. The timing of the jump does not coincide with the 
President’s speech or an economic data release. Here the frequency of the 
analysis offers a more nuanced picture of how investor expectations evolved 
over the day. Looking at Figure 9, a large negative jump is detected in both 
measures of information at 09:25. The figure confirms this corresponds with 
 
 
a sharp decline in the spot price of the underlying index, as expectations 
appear to have jumped in anticipation of the President’s proposal. By 10:15 
the S&P 500 was down 1.1 percent and the decline in information had already 
levelled off. The effect on uncertainty was large and persistent. Looking at 
Table 8, estimates of theta are -0.055 and -0.033 nats, representing a 98th 
percentile decline. Information did not recover following the President’s 
speech, ending the day down over 0.10 nats. 
The event presents evidence that uncertainty may jump in anticipation of 
events. Here the testing procedure identifies the exact timing of the shift in 
investor expectations. The jump coincides with the arrival of information prior 
to the President’s scheduled remarks later that morning. The evidence sug-
gests a lower frequency analysis risks misattributing this jump to a single data 
release, speech, or ambiguous combination of events. 
Looking at both events, each occurred approximately 40 trading days or 
two calendar months from the expiration date of two separate option chains. 
The level of entropy is noticeably lower in July 2010, reflecting the growing 
macroeconomic uncertainty. The estimated trend is also dramatically larger, 
reflecting how market beliefs were evolving prior to the Chairman’s testimony 
that day. The event demonstrates how information may also trend in antici-
pation of events. In this case, the jump reversed this trend, reflecting the 
uncertainty the Chairman’s statement added to expectations.  
Several statements by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are 
identified by the testing procedure. These include statements released in 
 
 
March 2009, September 2012, and December 2013 affecting the Federal Re-
serve’s use of quantitative easing to stimulate the US economy. On March 18, 
2009, the FOMC announced new efforts to purchase long-term US government 
debt and expanded their purchases of mortgage-backed securities. On Sep-
tember 13, 2012, they expanded these purchases further, and would not an-
nounce any reduction in their efforts until December 18, 2013. Official state-
ments from the FOMC were released at 13:15, 11:30, and at 13:00 CT on 
those days. Looking at Figure 10, the timing of each jump coincides with the 
release. From Table 8, each announcement arrived less than two weeks before 
the current option chain expired. In all three instances, the spot price of the 
underlying index increased, and finished the day between 1.6 and 2.1 percent 
higher. For the two later dates, the testing framework estimates a sharp in-
crease in information with theta ranging from 0.084 and 0.037 nats to 0.102 
and 0.082 nats respectively. Both jumps exceed the 98th percentile, as the 
S&P 500 reached multi-year and record highs in 2012 and 2013. The effect is 
large and persistent. The negative trend in information reflects the elevated 
level of near-term uncertainty as investors awaited the announcement.  
In comparison, the flat trend and low level of information for the earlier 
date reflects the extreme level of uncertainty during the Global Financial Cri-
sis. Here the FOMC announcement drove the spot price 3 percent higher. 
Estimates of theta however are negative, -0.031 and -0.011 nats, documenting 
a large increase in uncertainty. The effect was temporary, as the level of  
 
 






Figure 10 reports the results for the jumps identified on March 18, 2009, September 13, 2012, and De-
cember 18, 2013 for both measures of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , and 
the intraday level of both the underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility or VIX Index. Panels 1, 3, 




information recovered later that day. Yet the event suggests that investors 
consider both short and long-term implications of new information. For ex-
ample, whether the expanded stimulus efforts also revealed a more pessimistic 
view of the recovery. 
In summary, the first case study presents evidence that significant new in-
formation is revealed in the statements of policymakers. Events are distin-
guished by their effect on uncertainty, timing, and persistence. The case study 




The second case study demonstrates how information arrives in the actions 
of lawmakers. The category includes news related to the progress of legislation 
in the United States Congress and focuses on the 2009 stimulus package and 
2011 debt ceiling increase. Events are distinguished by a lack of a reliable 
timestamp and their effect on uncertainty concerning the state of fiscal policy. 
The case study presents evidence that information is revealed in the action of 
Congress and demonstrates the testing procedure’s ability to identify the tim-
ing of significant news events.  
Several legislative actions are identified by the testing procedure. These 
events include the introduction of an economic stimulus package in mid-Jan-
uary 2009, the deal to raise the government’s borrowing limit in early August 
 
 
2011, and the deadlock in the congressional budget ‘super committee’ in mid-
November 2011.  
By midday on January 15, 2009, the S&P 500 was down 2.6 percent, 
weighed down by the news of Bank of America’s request for additional capital 
from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). President Obama was not 
due to take office for another week, and it remained uncertain whether the 
new government would be able to prevent the recession from deepening. On 
this day, the testing procedure detected a large gain in information around 
12:40 CT. Estimates of theta are 0.024 and 0.022 nats, near the 90th percen-
tile. The effect was large and persistent. Figure 11 shows the jump corresponds 
with a steady increase in the spot price, reversing earlier declines. The under-
lying index finished the session up 0.1 percent. The event presents evidence 
that information is revealed in the action of Congress. Looking at reports for 
the day, the timing of the jump coincides with news that House Democrats 
were ready to introduce a stimulus package to Congress which included tax 
cuts and billions in new spending and aid to states. At the time, the incoming 
President had already announced his intention to sign the new legislation by 
mid-February  
A second jump in uncertainty was detected on August 1, 2011, shortly after 
09:00 CT. Estimates of theta are -0.028 and -0.023 nats, near the 90th and 
95th percentiles. At first glance, reports for the day are dominated by the 
news that President Obama and Congressional leaders had reached a deal late 
Sunday night to increase the government’s borrowing limit. Stocks had opened  
 
 






Figure 11 reports the results for the jumps identified on January 15, 2009, August 1 2011, and 
November 17, 2011 for both measures of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, 
, and the intraday level of both the underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility Index. 




sharply higher on this news. However, looking at Figure 11, the detected jump 
does not coincide with the open and by 10:00 the S&P 500 was down 1.3 
percent. This event demonstrates the procedure’s ability to identify the 
source, effect, and persistence of new information. Looking at all news for the 
day, weak manufacturing data was released at 09:00, with the ISM manufac-
turing index coming in at 50.9, well below expectations of 54.5. The release 
coincides with the jump identified at 09:00. The evidence suggests the infor-
mation was significant and unexpected, as uncertainty increased in response. 
The effect was also persistent, as information did not recover for the day, 
despite a large and positive trend in both measures. 
A third jump in uncertainty was detected shortly before 11:30 CT on No-
vember 11, 2011, on a morning the index had been mostly flat. The day before, 
stocks had fallen on news that US banks were increasingly vulnerable to con-
tagion from eurozone debt. A week earlier, uncertainty had jumped as the 
yield on the 10-year Italian bond closed above 7.1 percent. This can be seen 
in the initial level of entropy for the day. When news reports began to arrive 
that the Congressional budget ‘super committee’ was deadlocked days before 
their deadline information crashed. The effect on uncertainty was large and 
persistent. Estimates of theta are in the 99th percentile, over -0.072 and -
0.083 nats. In 10 minutes, the spot price had fallen almost 2 percent. Figure 




The second case study presents evidence that information about the state 
of fiscal policy is revealed in the action of legislators. Measuring the effect of 
that information however requires being able to detect its arrival to investors, 
a fact that is not trivial given the lack of reliable timestamp. The second 
category of discreet events demonstrates the testing procedure’s ability to 
identify the source and timing of such information. 
 
8.3 Flash Crashes 
The final case study demonstrates the effect of a flash crash in the underly-
ing index on information. The category includes two sudden, large, and ex-
tremely volatile declines in the spot price of the S&P 500. Each event is dis-
tinguished by its effect on uncertainty, timing, and persistence. The events 
occurred in May 2010 and April 2013. The study presents evidence that the 
rapid arrival of unanticipated information led to a dramatic spike in uncer-
tainty, and that information did not recover until the cause of volatility was 
known. 
On the morning of May 6, 2010, the S&P 500 opened flat as markets awaited 
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision on interest rates. News that day 
was dominated by concerns over Europe’s sovereign debt, with spreads on 
Portuguese and Spanish bonds approaching all-time highs. Just the day be-
fore, Greece had passed the austerity measures necessary to access the euro-
zone bailout. Premarket, US economic data was mixed; with first-quarter  
 
 





Figure 12 reports the results for the jumps identified on May 6, 2010 and April 23, 2013 for both measures 
of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , and the intraday level of both the 
underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility or VIX Index. Panels 1 and 3 report the fitted model for 
each entropy in black and the detected jump θ ̂in red. 
 
productivity beating expectations, while unemployment and retail sales fell 
short of forecasts. Selling began in earnest shortly after 08:00 CT. At 08:30 
the ECB announced its decision to leave interest rates unchanged. By 13:00 
the underlying index was down 1.6 percent on reports that markets had 
turned their attention to the risk of contagion within Europe’s periphery. By 
13:40 the index was down 4.1 percent. Then information collapsed.  
 
 
In 5 minutes, the S&P 500 fell another 4.5 percent, bottoming out at 13:46, 
down almost 8.6 percent. From 13:40 to 13:45, Shannon entropy fell 0.14 nats 
and Rényi entropy dropped 0.19 nats, two of the largest declines in the sam-
ple. As markets scrambled to identify the cause of the panic, the selling re-
versed. Five minutes later the index had recovered. Information however had 
not, and volatility continued throughout the session.  
The event presents evidence that uncertainty remained elevated while the 
cause of volatility was unknown. The testing procedure places the beginning 
of the crash at 13:35 CT, and estimates of theta are -0.075 and -0.083 nats, 
both in the 99th percentile. The effect on uncertainty was dramatic and per-
sistent. The estimated trend is both large and negative. By14:00 information 
had fallen 0.40 nats and would not recover until after 14:30. Looking at Figure 
12, neither measure of information returned to pre-crash levels that day. The 
S&P 500 closed down 3.2 percent. 
At the time, the source of volatility could not be found. Initial reports 
blamed the crash on a ‘flight to safety’ amid fears that Europe’s debt problems 
would end the economic recovery. As the day closed however, attention turned 
to reports that a trading error may have caused the massive sell-off. By the 
end of the week, regulators had turned their focus to the role of high-frequency 
traders in exacerbating price declines. The official report on the events leading 
up to the May 6th flash crash would not be published until September 2010. 
By comparison, the cause of the flash crash in April 2013 was immediately 
clear. “Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barak Obama is 
 
 
injured” tweeted the Associated Press (@AP) just after 12:00 CT on April 23, 
2013. As the news hit markets, the S&P 500 fell 1 percent in 3 minutes. The 
testing procedure identifies the crash at 12:05 and estimates the loss to be 
near -0.027 and -0.048 nats, in the 90th and 99th percentiles. From 12:00 to 
12:05, Shannon entropy fell 0.10 nats and Rényi entropy sank 0.06 nats. 
Minutes later the index rebounded as information arrived that the AP’s twit-
ter account had been hacked. Reports of an explosion at the White House 
were false. The effect on uncertainty then was large but temporary. By 12:20 
information had returned to pre-crash levels. Following the event, the esti-
mated trend is large and positive. Looking at Figure 12, both measures of 
information recovered quickly, with the underlying index finishing the day up 
1 percent.  
The final case study presents evidence that the rapid arrival of unantici-
pated information led to a dramatic spike in uncertainty. Each flash crash was 
defined by a sudden, large, and volatile declines in the spot price of the un-
derlying index. The May 2010 and April 2013 events are distinguished by their 
effect on uncertainty and persistence. Both are large, and the events present 
evidence that information did not recover until the cause of volatility was 
known.  
In summary, the events in each case study are defined by how the arrival of 
new information affects uncertainty, whether that information was antici-
pated, and if its effect was persistent. In a first application, each study demon-
strates the method’s ability to identify, quantify, and test for the effect of new 
 
 
information on the beliefs of market participants. The results demonstrate the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of how investor expectations respond 
to information. In practice, investors, researchers, and policymakers should 
consider carefully how they quantify uncertainty and identify events of inter-
est to their analysis. Going forward, similar methods could be used to identify 
jumps in the underlying asset and to determine whether market participants 
view such jumps as temporary or persistent over time. Current work is un-
derway to investigate the ability of these measures of information to forecast 
realized variance, model the term structure of volatility, and quantify the ef-
fect of different sources of information on the beliefs of market participants. 
 
9 Conclusions  
In this paper, I confront the basic characterization of the process by which 
investors learn about the future value of an asset. The paper is the first to 
quantify in real time how information drives price discovery in option markets. 
In doing so, I offer three methodological contributions to the literature on 
measuring the information found in option prices, and document two empiri-
cal facts not explained by existing theoretical models.  
I provide a high-frequency analysis of the price discovery process in option 
markets. Using six years of data for options written on the S&P 500 and 
traded on the Chicago Board of Exchange, I characterize the intraday evolu-
tion of the density function implied by the price of options with the same 
 
 
maturity date. The analysis is done for the final 3 months of each option’s life 
cycle, as the density is shown to become more and more concentrated over 
time. This paper is the first to estimate the intraday dynamics of the risk-
neutral density over the life cycle, and offers the following three methodolog-
ical contributions to the literature. First, I show how a simple nonparametric 
estimator can be used to approximate the implied density of future returns at 
high frequencies. Second, I show how concepts developed in information the-
ory can be used to quantify the amount of information contained in the esti-
mated density. Third, I show how this novel approach permits a simple testing 
procedure for the presence of jumps in the evolution of the risk-neutral den-
sity, coinciding with the arrival of new information. The results of this testing 
procedure represent the paper’s main contribution to the literature. 
I investigate how information arrives in financial markets, and I find that 
information often arrives in discrete intervals. Even at high-frequencies the 
risk-neutral density can be shown to jump, a result not anticipated by existing 
theoretical models. The testing procedure reveals both the frequency and 
magnitude of these jumps in investor expectations. I identify at least one jump 
for a majority of days, and find days without jumps contribute little to the 
total information gained over the life cycle. I then document two empirical 
facts new to the literature: First, the majority of information accrues only in 
the final month. I show investors learn little about the future price of an asset 
for much of an option’s life. Second, jumps contribute a majority of 
 
 
information early in the life cycle. Only in the final month does information 
arrive often enough to contribute more to the total gained. 
The paper builds on earlier work in many ways, but several features distin-
guish the findings from previous results. These include; 1. a focus on the 
evolution of the risk-neutral density over an option’s life cycle, 2. a fully non-
parametric estimation technique, 3. a measure of information as a reduction 
in uncertainty, 4. a simple framework to test for jumps, and 5. the frequency 
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Maturity Count Minimum Maximum Average Std. Dev. Option Ex Date Count Minimum Maximum Average Std. Dev.
2009-03-21 Strikes 110        200     1,600.00 857.65    82.57 2012-03-17 Strikes 154         400      1,550.00 1,080.10 14.59
Calls 730,566   0.03    630.69    89.90     14.44 Calls 311,975   0.03     1,001.60 270.89   33.50
Underlying 724,788   674     934.39    807.95    66.88 Underlying 293,866   1,204   1,402.61 1,323.45 44.76
2009-06-20 Strikes 118        300     1,600.00 802.55    25.08 2012-06-16 Strikes 157         450      1,750.00 1,156.40 27.44
Calls 948,751   0.03    645.55    155.58    26.68 Calls 613,567   0.03     962.40   251.98   14.47
Underlying 950,198   786     947.71    880.67    44.19 Underlying 583,803   1,278   1,419.18 1,360.77 40.63
2009-09-19 Strikes 114        450     1,650.00 899.55    41.57 2012-09-22 Strikes 131         400      1,600.00 1,169.96 6.13
Calls 666,463   0.03    617.52    149.95    31.37 Calls 423,603   0.03     1,064.22 245.27   26.85
Underlying 669,623   879     1,068.76 976.62    53.17 Underlying 412,665   1,314   1,464.25 1,387.58 39.40
2009-12-19 Strikes 125        450     1,550.00 958.43    16.40 2012-12-22 Strikes 157         350      1,800.00 1,222.06 15.78
Calls 508,810   0.03    663.64    180.09    21.49 Calls 768,118   0.03     1,105.25 254.77   19.29
Underlying 510,326   1,025    1,114.16 1,080.27 24.07 Underlying 758,723   1,353   1,462.10 1,420.25 26.64
2010-03-20 Strikes 134        400     1,500.00 974.39    12.82 2013-03-16 Strikes 156         350      1,800.00 1,217.09 9.21
Calls 326,984   0.03    765.84    199.05    21.50 Calls 640,450   0.03     1,212.67 303.08   28.06
Underlying 328,884   1,057    1,166.21 1,116.48 27.72 Underlying 630,545   1,403   1,563.25 1,498.68 35.88
2010-06-19 Strikes 124        550     1,500.00 1,024.83 15.83 2013-06-22 Strikes 149         900      1,850.00 1,397.21 14.06
Calls 592,298   0.03    662.63    175.34    25.00 Calls 911,785   0.03     766.75   236.32   30.46
Underlying 579,694   1,051    1,217.16 1,146.51 50.43 Underlying 908,343   1,542   1,669.34 1,603.54 39.20
2010-09-18 Strikes 116        600     1,400.00 987.32    14.19 2013-09-21 Strikes 171         650      2,000.00 1,415.36 13.62
Calls 603,780   0.03    525.39    156.42    26.13 Calls 775,906   0.03     1,074.66 295.04   32.17
Underlying 605,497   1,022    1,128.25 1,086.60 27.73 Underlying 774,767   1,573   1,725.28 1,667.12 33.00
2010-12-18 Strikes 127        350     1,500.00 999.74    7.97 2013-12-21 Strikes 163         850      2,100.00 1,505.10 6.25
Calls 315,365   0.03    892.70    228.38    21.24 Calls 813,782   0.03     959.51   283.22   33.18
Underlying 316,956   1,124    1,242.87 1,187.25 31.12 Underlying 814,691   1,656   1,810.83 1,753.01 44.79
2011-03-19 Strikes 132        350     1,600.00 1,077.37 6.22 2014-03-22 Strikes 187         650      2,150.00 1,536.28 5.75
Calls 398,175   0.03    990.37    256.34    19.85 Calls 1,004,186 0.03     1,226.51 331.89   32.44
Underlying 385,724   1,247    1,343.01 1,294.92 25.64 Underlying 994,344   1,741   1,878.04 1,832.26 32.15
2011-06-18 Strikes 123        550     1,550.00 1,154.30 7.48 2014-06-21 Strikes 179         900      2,150.00 1,595.54 9.14
Calls 545,121   0.03    810.19    212.51    14.07 Calls 1,036,519 0.03     1,058.53 320.98   33.35
Underlying 524,984   1,266    1,363.65 1,322.02 24.30 Underlying 1,052,149 1,816   1,959.47 1,889.78 34.05
2011-09-17 Strikes 132        550     1,550.00 1,124.09 28.17 2014-09-20 Strikes 187         700      2,200.00 1,617.38 2.62
Calls 861,006   0.03    799.34    188.95    29.96 Calls 666,667   0.03     1,312.05 378.46   21.67
Underlying 817,286   1,119    1,353.83 1,245.15 72.85 Underlying 645,371   1,908   2,011.64 1,972.74 24.53
2011-12-17 Strikes 164        150     1,550.00 993.27    6.88 2014-12-20 Strikes 196         700      2,250.00 1,648.19 14.01
Calls 778,565   0.03    1,131.37 273.30    32.09 Calls 1,959,596 0.03     1,373.14 377.08   42.93
Underlying 732,673   1,100    1,285.92 1,213.10 43.48 Underlying 1,942,217 1,862   2,075.37 1,996.52 58.27
Table A: Daily Summary Statistics
Table A reports standard summary statistics for the sample of call options used. Column 1 reports the average number of options, bids, and quotes observed each day. Columns 2 








































































































































































































































































Figure B presents histograms of the timing of the estimated daily jump in information for all 
days, and both measures of information, Shannon, , and Rényi, , entropy for all days 
in white and for days where the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected in grey. 
 
  





Figure C reports the estimated daily trend and jump estimates for separate subsamples and 
measures of entropy. In panels 1 and 4, the empirical cumulative distribution functions for the 
trend and jumps in Shannon, , and Rényi, , entropy are shown for the first 2-months, 
dashed, and the final month in black. Panels 2 and 3 report the histogram of trend and jumps 
in Shannon and Rényi entropy for all days in white and for days where the null hypothesis of a 









Figure D reports the results for the jumps identified on January 21, 2010 at 09:25 CT and July 21, 2010 
at 13:00 for both measures of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , the daily 
level of both the underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility or VIX Index, and volume. Panels 1 
and 3 report the t-statistics for each candidate model, the minimum t-statistic in red, and fitted alternative 
model for each entropy in black.  
 
  






Figure E reports the results for the jumps identified on March 18, 2009, September 13, 2012, and December 
18, 2013 for both measures of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , the daily 
level of both the underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility Index, and volume. Panels 1, 3, and 5 
report the t-statistics for each candidate model, the minimum t-statistic in red, and fitted alternative 
model for each entropy in black.
 
  






Figure F reports the results for the jumps identified on January 15, 2009, August 1 2011, and November 
17, 2011 for both measures of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , the daily 
level of both the underlying S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility Index, and volume. Panels 1, 3, and 5 
report the t-statistics for each candidate model, the minimum t-statistic in red, and fitted alternative 
model for each entropy in black.
 
  





Figure G reports the results for the jumps identified on May 6, 2010 and April 23, 2013 for both measures 
of information, Shannon entropy, , and Rényi entropy, , the daily level of both the underlying 
S&P 500 index and CBOE Volatility Index, and volume. Panels 1 and 3 report the t-statistics for each 
candidate model, the minimum t-statistic in red, and fitted alternative model for each entropy in black.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
